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IN DEFENSE OF TRIBAL SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY:
A PRAGMATIC LOOK AT THE DOCTRINE AS A TOOL FOR
STRENGTHENING TRIBAL COURTS
RYAN SEELAU*

ABSTRACT
Although the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity was recently
upheld by the Supreme Court in Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Community,1
its existence continues to be attacked as “antiquated” and leading to
“unfair” results. While most defenses of tribal sovereign immunity focus
on how the doctrine is a necessary part of sovereignty or how the doctrine is
necessary for financial reasons, the more pragmatic benefits of tribal
sovereign immunity have remained largely overlooked. Any desire to take
tribal self-determination seriously and to allow Native nations to produce
their own robust and capable governing systems means re-examining the
role tribal sovereign immunity plays in such efforts.
This article conducts such a re-examination. First, it takes note of the
extensive research indicating that strong tribal courts are generally
necessary for healthy and resilient Native nations. Second, it looks at the
six components that comprise strong tribal courts: (1) accountability; (2)
capacity; (3) funding; (4) independence; (5) jurisdiction; and (6) legitimacy.
Finally, it argues that the strategic use of tribal sovereign immunity has
positive effects on all six components of strong tribal court systems. In
essence, tribal sovereign immunity is a valuable tool that Native nations can
use to strengthen their own courts, institutions, and nations themselves.

*Co-Founder, Project for Indigenous Self-Determination. S.J.D., University of Arizona, 2009;
LL.M, University of Arizona, 2006; J.D., University of Iowa, 2005. I would like to thank the
following individuals for their contributions and support (in alphabetical order): Patrick Bauer,
Stephen Cornell, Charisa Delmar, Matthew Fletcher, Herminia Frias, Reneé Goldtooth, Emily
Hughes, Mary-Beth Jäeger, Carolyn Jones, Miriam Jorgensen, Emily McGovern, John McMinn,
Stephanie Rainie, Ian Record, Jennifer Schultz, Rachel Starks, Joan Timeche, John Whiston, and
the faculty of Stetson University who listened to me present a version of this paper in March of
2014. I’d also like to thank the Udall Center for Studies in Public Policy at the University of
Arizona for their support in developing this publication.
1. 134 S. Ct. 2024, 2029-31 (2014).
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INTRODUCTION

There is a revolution currently taking place in Native American
communities throughout the United States. After more than 200 years of
policies designed to destroy and/or assimilate Native American culture,
many Native nations have started taking control of their own destinies by
exercising true self-determination over the decisions that affect their
everyday lives.2 The result has been stronger and healthier communities.
Tribal courts and tribal justice systems play a key role in meaningful
exercises of Native American self-determination.3 A strong tribal court
system is critical to Native nation building4 because “it advances
sovereignty, helps uphold the nation’s constitution, helps ensure the
maintenance of law and order, bolsters economic development, promotes
peace and resolves conflicts within the community, preserves tribal
customs, and develops and implements new laws and practices for

2. Miriam Jorgensen, Editor’s Introduction to REBUILDING NATIVE NATIONS: STRATEGIES
xi, xii (Miriam Jorgensen, ed., 2007).
3. Raymond L. Niblock & William C. Plouffe, Federal Courts, Tribal Courts, and Comity:
Developing Tribal Judiciaries and Forum Selection, 19 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 219, 227
(1997) (“To be able to adjudicate a claim involving applicable law is an essential element of
sovereignty, self-government, and self-determination. Thus a critical part of promoting tribal selfgovernment is advancing a tribal judiciary.”).
4. See Stephen Brimley et al., Strengthening and Rebuilding Tribal Justice Systems:
Learning from History and Looking Towards the Future, NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE iii
(2005), www ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/210893.pdf (“‘Nation building’ refers to the process,
undertaken by indigenous nations themselves, of constructing effective institutions of selfgovernment that can provide a foundation for sustainable development, community health, and
successful political action. In other words, it is the process of promoting Indian nations’ selfdetermination, self-governance, and sovereignty—and, ultimately, of improving tribal citizens’
social and economic situations—through the creation of more capable, culturally legitimate
institutions of governance.”).
FOR GOVERNANCE AND DEVELOPMENT
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addressing contemporary realities.”5 But what makes a tribal court system
a strong tribal court system—what are the components of a strong tribal
court system? And how can Native nations strengthen their own court
systems?
In this article, I argue that strong tribal court systems are composed of
at least six components: accountability, capacity, funding, independence,
jurisdiction, and legitimacy.6 The extent to which these six components are
present or absent in a tribal court system has a large role in determining
whether, and to what degree, the court system is effective at carrying out its
goals. Furthermore, I argue that the often-maligned7 doctrine of tribal
sovereign immunity—and the ability of Native nations to determine how
and when to waive it—are critical in reinforcing the six aforementioned
components and, ultimately, in producing a strong tribal court system.8
To make these arguments, this article is divided into seven parts: Part
II examines the critical role tribal courts play in Native self-determination.
It does this by first looking at the so-called “nation building research,”
which explains how effective governing institutions are critical to any
Native self-determination efforts. Second, Part II explains the role courts
play in any society and why their functions are particularly important in the
context of Native nation building. Part III digs deeper into the
characteristics of a strong tribal court system and discusses six key
components—accountability, capacity, funding, independence, jurisdiction,
and legitimacy—drawn from the available literature on the topic. Part IV
introduces the legal doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity and looks briefly
5. Joseph Thomas Flies-Away, Carrie Garrow, & Miriam Jorgensen, Native Nation Courts:
Key Players in Nation Rebuilding, in REBUILDING NATIVE NATIONS: STRATEGIES FOR
GOVERNANCE AND DEVELOPMENT 115, 117 (Miriam Jorgensen, ed. 2007).
6. Listed alphabetically, not in order of importance.
7. See, e.g., Kiowa Tribe v. Mfg. Techs., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 766 (1998) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity is an unjust rule, and “[t]his is
especially so with respect to tort victims who have no opportunity to negotiate for a waiver of
sovereign immunity; yet nothing in the Court’s reasoning limits the rule to lawsuits arising out of
voluntary contractual relationships. Governments, like individuals, should pay their debts and
should be held accountable for their unlawful, injurious conduct.”); Erwin Chemerinsky, Against
Sovereign Immunity, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1201 (2001).
8. The central argument of this article is as an elaboration on the one put forth by another
commentator, Catherine Struve. In her piece, Struve argues that “tribes should use their immunity
as a forum-allocation device” and that “waiv[ing] immunity in tribal courts but not elsewhere can
simultaneously provide redress for valid claims and strengthen tribal court systems.” Catherine T.
Struve, Tribal Immunity and Tribal Courts, 36 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 137, 137 (2004). However, the body
of Struve’s piece is less concerned with how sovereign immunity waivers strengthen courts, and is
more concerned with establishing that the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity is justified within
the parameters of the U.S. political and legal systems. This article attempts to pick up where
Struve ended by exploring how the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity—and more importantly,
the practice of waiving it—actually strengthens tribal court systems. In that sense, this article is
neither a repetition nor a contraction of Struve’s work, but is instead a complimentary piece to it.
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at the justifications for its existence. Part V explains how the doctrine of
tribal sovereign immunity can be used to strengthen—or weaken—tribal
court systems. Part VI provides real-life examples of how Native nations
with strong court systems are using the doctrine of tribal sovereign
immunity to their benefit. Additionally, Part VI retells the stories of three
award-winning tribal court systems—the Mississippi Choctaw Band of
Indians’ Tribal Court System, the Northwest Intertribal Court System (with
a focus on the Tulalip Tribe’s actions within that system), and the Grand
Traverse Band of Ottawa and Chippewa Indians’ Tribal Court. Each case
study demonstrates a slightly different strategy with respect to the tribal
sovereign immunity doctrine, and together they offer examples other Native
nations can draw from. Finally, Part VII provides a brief conclusion.
II. NATION BUILDING AND TRIBAL COURTS
A. THE NATION BUILDING PRINCIPLES9
Indigenous self-determination is alive and well in United States Native
communities. After centuries of government policies designed to destroy
and/or assimilate Native American culture, many Native nations have retaken control of their own destinies by exercising true self-determination
over the decisions that affect their everyday lives.10 The result has been
stronger and healthier communities. But what “explain[s] the fact
that—despite decades of crippling poverty and powerlessness—some
American Indian nations recently [have] been strikingly successful at
achieving their own economic, political, social and cultural goals, while
others [are] having repeated difficulty accomplishing the same things?”11
The Harvard Project on American Indian Economic Development
(“Harvard Project”) and the Native Nations Institute for Leadership,
Management, and Policy (“NNI”) have been examining these types of
questions for more than twenty-five years.12 The results of their extensive
research indicate that five principles are crucial for successful community
development in Indian Country: (1) Native nations must make their own
decisions by exercising practical sovereignty, or self-rule; (2) Native
nations need to back-up their decisions with effective governing institutions;

9. Although modified, portions of Part II A and B of this paper originally appeared in the
Berkeley Journal of Criminal Law. See Ryan Seelau, The Kids Aren’t Alright: An Argument to
Use the Nation Building Model in the Development of Native Juvenile Justice Systems to Combat
the Effects of Failed Assimilative Policies, 17 BERKLEY J. CRIM. L. 97, 118-20, 124-28 (2012).
10. Jorgensen, supra note 2, at xii.
11. Id. at xi.
12. Id.
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(3) these governing institutions must match their own political cultures, that
is, they must exhibit cultural match;13 (4) Native nations need a strategic
orientation when making their decisions; and (5) Native leadership is
necessary to mobilize the community and promote community
development.14 Taken together, these five nation building principles
indicate that community development and economic development are,
above all else, governance problems and must be addressed as such.15
In its most basic formulation, the nation building principles refer to
“the processes by which a Native nation enhances its own foundational
capacity for effective self-governance and for self-determined community
and economic development.”16 The better a community adheres to the five
nation building principles, the greater chance that community has of
successfully achieving its cultural, economic, political and social goals.17
Practically speaking, the nation building principles take on many forms
within Indian Country.18 The nation building principles do not offer a onesize-fits-all formula that can be replicated in every community, but rather
present those factors that are critical for a community to successfully
address its own unique problems with its own unique solutions.
B. EFFECTIVE GOVERNING INSTITUTIONS
One of the nation building principles stemming from the Harvard
Project and NNI research states that self-determination and self-governance
13. See Brimley et al., supra note 4, at 14 (“Using a rigorous research methodology and
carefully chosen tribal comparisons, Cornell and Kalt show that certain tribes with identical
constitutional-level governing institutions have experienced radically different socioeconomic
outcomes, while other tribes with quite different institutions have realized comparable levels of
success. Other things equal, the variable that explains these divergent outcomes is ‘cultural
match’: if a nation’s institutional rules and processes are culturally legitimate (that is, if they
match underlying expectations of the way authority and power should be distributed and
exercised), they underwrite socioeconomic progress; if not, progress is difficult.”).
14. Stephen Cornell & Joseph P. Kalt, Two Approaches to the Development of Native
Nations: One Works, the Other Doesn’t, in REBUILDING NATIVE NATIONS: STRATEGIES FOR
GOVERNANCE AND DEVELOPMENT 3, 18 (Miriam Jorgensen ed., 2007).
15. See Stephen Cornell & Joseph P. Kalt, Where’s the Glue?: Institutional Bases of
American Indian Economic Development, 29 J. SOCIO-ECON. 443, 447 (2000) (“Economic
development is a social problem. Among other things, it requires that people organize themselves
in ways that take advantage of the fact that specialization by individuals in their production
activities is critically important to the advancement of their well-being.”); see also Miriam
Jorgensen & Jonathan Taylor, What Determines Indian Economic Success?: Evidence from
Tribal and Individual Indian Enterprises, NATIVE NATIONS INSTITUTE 6 (2000),
http://hpaied.org/images/resources/publibrary/PRS00-3.pdf (“Essentially the research of the
Harvard Project finds that poverty in Indian Country is a political problem—not an economic
one.”). For a more complete presentation of the Nation Building Model and its key components,
see Seelau, supra note 9, at 118-33.
16. Jorgenson, supra note 2, at xii.
17. Cornell & Kalt, supra note 14, at 6.
18. Id.
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are more likely to succeed when effective governing institutions capable of
carrying out Native nation policies are in place.19 Institutions are
responsible for implementing policy and transforming it from an idea on
paper to something practical that affects the lives of the nation’s citizens.
Institutions, to be useful for purposes of self-determination, must be
effective at achieving their designed purpose.20 Effective governing
institutions are stable and must have clear rules and policies in place to
define their rights and responsibilities as well as their relationship to other
aspects of government.21 Having well-defined institutional roles is
especially important because, in order to effectively govern, an institution is
frequently going to be part of a coordinated effort with other governing
institutions.
While the primary value of having effective governing institutions is
the ability to turn policy into action, such institutions provide additional
benefits as well. For example, effective governing institutions can reduce a
Native nation’s dependency on non-Native governments and the negative
consequences that often accompany such dependency,22 can provide an
opportunity for Native nations to demonstrate their skill in addressing
various political and social issues, which may lead to future opportunities to
increase practical sovereignty,23 and, if designed to be culturally relevant,
can create and reinforce Native norms.24 When Native nations “back up
sovereignty with stable, fair, effective, and reliable governing institutions,”
they “increase their chances of improving community well-being.”25
C. TRIBAL COURTS
Although exercising effective self-determination requires a variety of
effective governing institutions, a forum for non-politicized dispute

19. Id. at 22.
20. Id. at 24.
21. Id. at 23.
22. Amy Besaw et al., The Context and Meaning of Family Strengthening in Indian
Country: A Report to the Annie E. Casey Foundation, HARVARD PROJECT ON AMERICAN INDIAN
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 1, 20 (2004), http://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED485942.pdf.
23. For example, the Citizen Potawatomi Nation has increased its practical sovereignty by
developing a court system that is so effective in administering justice that local non-Native
communities willingly submit themselves to its jurisdiction. See Bethel Trustee Removed ‘Under
Operation of Law,’ THE TECUMSEH COUNTYWIDE NEWS AND THE SHAWNEE SUN, December 6,
2007, http://www.countywidenews.com/articles/2007/12/06/news/03bethel%20trustee.txt.
24. To put it another way, effective governing institutions can be a tool in the struggle
against assimilation and for cultural preservation. See generally John G. Red Horse et al., Family
Preservation: Concepts in American Indian Communities, NATIONAL INDIAN CHILD WELFARE
ASSOCIATION (2000), www.nicwa.org/research/01.FamilyPreservation.pdf.
25. Cornell & Kalt, supra note 14, at 24.
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resolution is among the most crucial.26 An independent dispute resolution
system is necessary to ensure that the rules and policies created by the
nation are enforced even-handedly, regardless of who is seeking to have
them enforced. More and more frequently for Native nations in the United
States, an independent dispute resolution system includes some type of
tribal court.27
Tribal courts play a significant role in self-determination and selfgovernance efforts and have responsibilities that “bear heavily on how well
Indian tribes succeed overall.”28 These responsibilities include: advancing
tribal sovereignty, empowering the other branches of government,
promoting peace and community health, and supporting economic growth.29
More generally, tribal courts “define the legal expectations on which
people—Indian and non-Indian—and entities will rely when living, visiting,
and doing business on the reservation.”30
III. THE MAKINGS OF STRONG TRIBAL COURTS
While there is widespread agreement that strong tribal court systems
are vital to self-determination among academics, government officials, and
practitioners alike, considerably less has been said or written about what
distinguishes a strong tribal court from a weak one. One of the most robust
attempts to define the elements of a strong tribal court system comes from
scholars Duane Champagne and Carole Goldberg. Champagne and
Goldberg propose a six-part framework outlining what tribal justice systems
require to be successful.31 The six requirements they outline are: control,
cultural competency, effective management, fairness, funding, and
intergovernmental cooperation.32 While their book offers compelling
support for the proposed framework, it is significant to note that the
26. Id. at 23; Niblock & Plouffe, supra note 3, at 227 (“To be able to adjudicate a claim
involving applicable law is an essential element of sovereignty, self-government, and selfdetermination. Thus a critical part of promoting tribal self-government is advancing a tribal
judiciary.”).
27. Compare Tribal Courts and the Administration of Justice in Indian Country: Hearing
Before the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 110th Cong. 576-1 (2008) (statement of Sen. Byron
Dorgan) (“Today, there are about 290 tribal district courts and more than 150 tribal appellate
courts.”), with Sandra Day O’Connor, Lessons from the Third Sovereign: Indian Tribal Courts,
33 TULSA L.J. 1, 1 (1997) (“As of 1992, there were about 170 tribal courts, with jurisdiction
encompassing a total of perhaps one million Americans.”).
28. Douglas B. L. Enderson, The Challenges Facing Tribal Courts Today, 79 JUDICATURE
143-44 (1995).
29. See generally Flies-Away, Garrow, & Jorgensen, supra note 5, at 115-45.
30. Enderson, supra note 28, 143-44.
31. See DUANE CHAMPAGNE & CAROLE GOLDBERG, CAPTURED JUSTICE: NATIVE
NATIONS AND PUBLIC LAW 280 (2012).
32. Id.
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authors’ framework was written—as the book title indicates—for Native
nations living under Public Law 280 (“P.L. 280”) jurisdiction.33 And
within that context, the authors are particularly concerned with the
administration of criminal justice within such jurisdictions. While neither
consideration radically harms the usefulness of the proposed framework, it
does mean the framework possesses some limitations when applied outside
the criminal justice context of P.L. 280 states. Given the specific context of
their work, I offer my own modification on the Champagne-Goldberg
framework, which I assembled from a number of sources.34 Upon
completing this research, six components of strong tribal court systems
emerged: accountability, capacity, funding; independence, jurisdiction, and
legitimacy.
A. ACCOUNTABILITY
Strong tribal court systems are accountable for the decisions they
produce. Or, to put it more accurately, judges in strong tribal court systems
are accountable for their actions. Accountability likely means that some
mechanism for reprimand and/or removal is in place in the event a judge
begins to act in bad faith or conducts him or herself unethically. For many
Native nations, this accountability might be tied to an election of some sort
or to a removal proceeding. Regardless of the exact mechanism employed
by a Native nation to ensure accountability, accountability needs to occur
within the confines of an independent judiciary. A judge who can be
removed at the whim of another branch of government may be accountable
to that branch of government in the technical sense, but the cost of that
accountability is a lack of judicial independence, which is another
component necessary for a strong tribal court system.35
33. For more information on P.L. 280, see, e.g., Carole E. Goldberg & Duane Champagne,
Is Public Law 280 Fit for the Twenty-First Century? Some Data at Last, 38 CONN. L. REV. 697,
700-01 (2006) (“Public Law 280 authorized state criminal jurisdiction over Indians and nonIndians on reservations in six named states with significant numbers of federally recognized
tribes: Alaska (added in 1958 when it became a state), California, Minnesota, Nebraska, Oregon,
and Wisconsin . . . . The act also allowed all other states to opt for similar jurisdiction, and several
did so . . . Public Law 280 did not eliminate or limit tribal criminal jurisdiction, although the
Department of the Interior often used it as a justification for denying funding support to tribes in
the affected states for law enforcement and criminal justice.”).
34. These sources include review of the academic legal literature, including, of course,
Champagne and Goldberg’s CAPTURED JUSTICE, a review of the literature produced by
non-Indian government officials, a review of the literature produced by non-Indian businesspeople
who interact regularly with Native nations, and, most importantly, a review of the literature
produced by employees of, and practitioners in, tribal courts.
35. See discussion infra Part III.D. for a more complete discussion of “independence” as a
component of strong tribal court systems. See also Tim Shimizu, Strengthening Sovereignty
Through the Courts: How Native American Tribal Courts Can Inform Native Hawaiian Nation
Building, 17 UCLA ASIAN PAC. AM. L.J. 56, 72-73 (2012).
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Accountability may also be achieved, in part or in whole, through the
use of appellate courts.36 While appellate court systems may be neither
feasible nor desirable for all Native nations, they do offer the benefit of
keeping lower court judges accountable for the decisions they make.37
Ideally, an appellate judge will have more capacity—i.e. experience and
training—than the lower court judges he or she is reviewing in order to
ensure that the best decision possible is being reached in any given case. In
order to be a component of a strong tribal court system, appellate review
needs to occur within the confines of an independent judiciary. A tribal
council conducting appellate review of a tribal court judge may promote
accountability, but at the expense of independence.
B. CAPACITY
Strong tribal court systems require the capacity necessary to administer
justice. This component is comprised of both human capacity and
institutional capacity. A tribal court system’s capacity, in the literal sense,
is the number of disputes it can resolve over a given period of time. This is
dependent on both the human and institutional limitations of a given court
system.38 Capacity, in a more general sense, includes not just the literal
number of disputes that a court system can handle, but also the skill and
effectiveness with which those disputes are dealt.
As such, human capacity includes the abilities, education-level,
experience, and skills of all who service the tribal court system, including
clerks, judges, lawyers, and support staff. The need to improve human
capacity within many tribal court systems was identified decades ago and
continues to this day.39 Discussions of human capacity frequently revolve
around the need, on one hand, to have educated and trained tribal court
personnel and the need, on the other hand, to have those same personnel be
aware of and understand the unique cultural norms and values of the
community they are serving.40

36. Hearing, supra note 27 (statement of Sen. Byron Dorgan) (“Today, there are about 290
tribal district courts and more than 150 appellate courts.”).
37. Tribal Court Systems and Indian Civil Rights Act: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on
Indian Affairs, 100th Cong. 338-36 (1988) (statement of Joseph Little).
38. Frank Pommersheim, What Must be Done to Achieve the Vision of the Twenty-First
Century Tribal Judiciary, 7 KAN. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 8, 12 (1997).
39. O’Connor, supra note 27, at 5; see also Kirke Kickingbird, Striving for the
Independence of Native American Tribal Courts, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION (2009),
http://www.americanbar.org/publications/human_rights_magazine_home/human_rights_vol36_20
09/winter2009/striving_for_the_independence_of_native_american_tribal_courts html.
40. Tribal Courts and the Administration of Justice in Indian Country: Hearing Before the
S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 110th Cong. 576-10 (2008) (statement by Roman Duran).
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While human capacity is undoubtedly the heart and soul of any tribal
court system, the importance of institutional capacity cannot be
overlooked.41 Institutional capacity involves all of the non-human elements
that make up a tribal court system—the building itself, the computer
network, the filing system, and so forth. For example, in the context of
criminal justice, institutional capacity would likely extend to the availability
of beds in juvenile centers and adult prisons. A Native nation’s institutional
capacity can have a surprisingly strong effect on how justice is administered
and, in certain circumstances, may directly affect perceptions of
legitimacy.42 As with human capacity, institutional capacity of a tribal
court system is also tied very closely to the issue of funding.
C. FUNDING
Funding is without a doubt the component of strong tribal court
systems upon which there is the greatest consensus and greatest amount
written.43 Without delving into the history of the underfunding of tribal
court systems or the efforts to help remedy deficiencies in funding, it
suffices to say that funding hugely impacts the relative strength or weakness
of a tribal court system. The reasons for this are obvious and include the
fact that funding has an enormous role in determining the various capacities
of a tribal court system.
And the capacities—both human and
institutional—of a tribal court system go a long way in determining the
overall strength of the system.
D. INDEPENDENCE
Strong tribal court systems must be independent from outside
influences. Most importantly, this means tribal court judges need to be able
to make decisions freely and independently of influences from other
branches of government. To this end, tribal court judges need to be able to
make decisions without fear of retaliation from other branches of
government and without the possibility that other branches of government
will improperly overturn their decisions. Tribal court systems also need to
be independent from other outside influences, including other courts,
41. Id. at 5 (statement by Patrick Ragsdale) (“Although the main request from tribal courts
is operating funding, the next two main areas that tribal courts consistently seek assistance is in
training for tribal judges and staff, and technical assistance in developing judicial administrative
systems.”). See also id. at 13 (statement of Roman Duran) (“A vital note to make here is that most
tribal justice systems lack access to law libraries, legal authorities, internet access, and law clerks
to provide the needed research in rendering decisions.”).
42. See discussion infra Part III.F. for a more complete discussion of “legitimacy” as a
component of strong tribal court systems.
43. See generally Kickingbird, supra note 39; Hearing, supra note 27.
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governments, and corporations. A non-independent tribal court system will
likely lose legitimacy in the eyes of the nation itself and with those who do
business with the nation. And a reputation of non-independence can easily
lead to devastating consequences.44 To avoid such consequences, Native
nations may enact laws and procedures to ensure the independence of a
tribal court system.45
E. JURISDICTION
Strong tribal courts—like any other type of court—require jurisdiction
within which to operate. The best funded, most accountable, independent,
and legitimate court system in the world, even if staffed with the brightest
human minds, would be of no value if it had no jurisdiction. At first glance,
those familiar with federal Indian law may argue that this should not be a
component of strong tribal court systems because it is something seemingly
outside the control of any individual Native nation. The reality, however, is
that while the outer boundaries of tribal jurisdiction may largely be setup by
the contours of federal Indian law, in practice, Native nations have some
significant control over the cases they hear.
Native nations have some discretion over the types of cases their tribal
judicial systems hear limited, of course, by the jurisdictional confines of
federal Indian law.46 This control is evident when one compares a Native
nation with no tribal court system with a Native nation that has such a
system. Native nations with no tribal court systems have the same de jure
jurisdiction as nations with court systems, but their de facto jurisdiction is
essentially non-existent because they have no way to exercise it. To put it
differently, because Native nations are governments, they have a significant
amount of control over both the procedural law and substantive law
governing cases that come before their courts. Additionally, Native nations
44. See Jorgensen & Taylor, supra note 15, at 5 (“Thus, all else equal, tribes that implement
a separation of powers that leaves their dispute resolution mechanisms outside political influence
enjoy a 5 percent lower level of unemployment than tribes that do not.”).
45. However, it is worth saying that adequate funding of court system personnel may, in
certain circumstance, play a limited role in deterring the likelihood that one type of
influence—money—will have any effect on influencing court personnel.
46. For example, Native nations’ jurisdiction over nonmembers in civil actions is limited;
see, e.g., Katherine Florey, Beyond Uniqueness: Reimagining Tribal Courts’ Jurisdiction, 101
CALIF. L. REV. 1499, 1503 (2013) (“In the past few decades, the Supreme Court has undertaken a
near-complete dismantling of tribal civil jurisdiction over nonmembers. Following cases like
Montana, Strate, and Hicks, tribes have virtually no authority to regulate nonmember conduct or
hale nonmembers into tribal court—even when nonmembers have significant ties to the tribe and
have come onto the reservation deliberately and for personal gain.”). Similarly, Native nations
criminal jurisdiction over nonmembers is essentially nonexistent. See 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (1817);
but see Samuel E. Ennis, Reaffirming Indian Tribal Court Criminal Jurisdiction Over NonIndians: An Argument for a Statutory Abrogation of Oliphant, 57 UCLA L. REV. 553 (2009).
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have some ability to work around the jurisdictional confines of federal
Indian law through consensual jurisdiction. Although not an unlimited
principle, tribal court systems are able to hear many types of cases that
initially may seem to be outside the scope of tribal jurisdiction, so long as
the party or parties involved consent to jurisdiction.47 In this respect, the
doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity—discussed later in this
article—provides Native nations with a tool that can assist in acquiring the
consent necessary to expand tribal jurisdiction. Native nations have
expanded their jurisdiction based on consent to: provide court services to
non-Native communities,48 ensure that taxation disputes with states go
through tribal court,49 and address a myriad of difficult criminal and social
problems.50
F. LEGITIMACY
Strong tribal court systems must be legitimate in the eyes of the
citizenry whom they serve and, secondarily, in the eyes of the non-Native
population with which the nation interacts or has the desire to interact
with.51 Tribal court systems “must strive to embody tribal values—values
that at times suggest the use of different methods than those used in the
Anglo-American, adversarial, common-law tradition.”52 If a tribal court
does not reflect tribal values, the very people the court is designed to serve
will see it as illegitimate. There is now a strong body of empirical evidence
clearly indicating that illegitimate institutions significantly harm Native
nations’ self-determination efforts.53 On the other hand, because “law is

47. For a thorough discussion of how nonmembers consent to tribal criminal jurisdiction,
see Paul Spruhan, “Indians, in a Jurisdictional Sense”: Tribal Citizenship and Other Forms of
Non-Indian Consent to Tribal Criminal Jurisdiction, 1 AM. INDIAN L.J. 79 (2013).
48. See Seelau, supra note 9, at 127.
49. Matthew L.M. Fletcher, The Power to Tax, the Power to Destroy, and the Michigan
Tribal-State Tax Agreements, 82 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 1, 32 (2004).
50. See Seelau, supra note 9, at 130-33 (case study from the Organized Village of Kake
demonstrating how a de facto expansion of jurisdiction can be used to combat underage drinking
and other social ills in remote locations).
51. O’Connor, supra note 27, at 2.
52. Id.
53. Brimley et al., supra note 4, at 14 (“Using a rigorous research methodology and
carefully chosen tribal comparisons, Cornell and Kalt show that certain tribes with identical
constitutional-level governing institutions have experienced radically different socioeconomic
outcomes, while other tribes with quite different institutions have realized comparable levels of
success. Other things equal, the variable that explains these divergent outcomes is “cultural
match”: if a nation’s institutional rules and processes are culturally legitimate (that is, if they
match underlying expectations of the way authority and power should be distributed and
exercised), they underwrite socioeconomic progress; if not, progress is difficult.”).
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one of the methods by which a community constitutes its own identity,”54 a
legitimate tribal court is able to define and promote its nation’s Native
culture through procedures and substantive decisions.55 Specifically, a
culturally legitimate tribal court can take laws developed by the nation and
“interpret[] them according to culturally distinct traditions and customs,”
and by doing so, the court helps advance the nation’s “own agenda for the
future.”56
In addition to being accepted as legitimate by the Native nation’s own
citizenry, a tribal court system “must provide a forum that commands the
respect of . . . the non-tribal community, including courts, governments, and
litigants.”57 Tribal court systems rely on external legitimacy to encourage
non-Indian actors—particularly those related to economic development—to
engage with the nation58 and to discourage non-Indian actors—particularly
state governments and the federal government—from interfering with tribal
authority.59 With respect to encouraging non-Indian actors to engage with
the nation, there is now ample evidence to indicate that a tribal court system
that is seen as legitimate by external actors is “an indispensable foundation”
to any substantial economic development efforts because it is the court that
“helps create an atmosphere of fair play in the disputes that inevitably arise
among those who live, work, or do business in a tribal community.”60
Along the same lines, when a tribal court system is deemed to be
illegitimate by external actors—particularly by state governments and/or the
federal government—outside actors tend to make efforts to interfere with
Native nations’ sovereignty in an effort to fix a perceived injustice.61 On
54. Nell Jessup Newton, Tribal Court Praxis: One Year in the Life of Twenty Indian Tribal
Courts, 22 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 285, 293 (1998).
55. See, e.g., Seelau, supra note 9, at 124-29.
56. Flies-Away, Garrow, & Jorgensen, supra note 5, at 117 (emphasis added).
57. O’Connor, supra note 27, at 2.
58. See, e.g., Hearing, supra note 37, at 21 (statement by Joseph Flies-Away) (“Tribal
courts are “a way to contribute to economic development, our economic possibility. When people
want to come to the reservation and do business and there is a fair playing field to do so, then that
is going to be a court, a good court is going to be a place where they can come and actually feel
good and comfortable about doing business there.”).
59. Newton, supra note 54, at 293.
60. Flies-Away, Garrow, and Jorgensen, supra note 5, at 118-19.
61. The Cherokee Freedman saga that ultimately resulted in federal intervention is perhaps
the best recent example of perceived unfairness resulting in outside actors getting involved in
Native nation government. See, e.g., Chris Casteel, Obama administration lawsuit could finally
decide freedmen issue, Cherokee Nation says, NEWOK, July 4, 2012, http://newsok.com/obamaadministration-lawsuit-could-finally-decide-freedmen-issue-cherokee-nationsays/article/3689660; Julianne Jennings, Cherokee Freedmen: One Year Later, INDIAN COUNTRY
TODAY
MEDIA
NETWORK,
Jan.
31,
2012,
http://indiancountrytodaymedianetwork.com/opinion/cherokee-freedmen%3A-one-year-later78777; Nathan Koppel, Tribe Fights with Slaves’ Kin, WALL ST. J., July 16, 2012,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303292204577519000907248734.html.
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the other hand, when a Native nation’s court system is seen as legitimate by
external actors, not only do non-Native governments tend to interfere less,
but they may, in certain circumstances, seek to partner with Native nations
capable of administering justice in a competent, legitimate, and efficient
fashion.62
But what does a tribal court system need to do in order to be judged
“legitimate” by external actors? The answer seems to rest in the concept of
fairness.63 Tribal court systems that are deemed “fair” will be treated as
legitimate courts, while “unfair” courts will be called “illegitimate,”
“dishonest,” or “kangaroo courts.” While fairness is always going to be in
the eye of the beholder to some degree, courts around the world have agreed
on a set of principles that, generally speaking, separate fair courts from
unfair ones. One principle is that every wrong must have a remedy. 64 The
quickest way to be deemed an unfair court is to turn away individuals who
believe they have been seriously wronged and seek redress in the judicial
system. Second, fair courts must have procedures in place to dispense
justice and, more importantly, those procedures must treat all individuals
equally.65 Third, fair courts must dispense justice consistently—meaning
similar cases must be decided similarly.66 Fourth, fair courts require
judicial independence, a topic discussed above. And finally, fair court
systems tend to be transparent systems—everyone knows the rules ahead of
time, everyone understand how a decision is going to be made, and
everyone has access to a decision after it has been produced.67 Perhaps
surprisingly to some, fairness in a court context is more about notice and
procedure than it is about substantive outcomes—telling people how the
process will work and then making sure it works as advertised will go a
long ways in getting a court labeled “fair.”
While identifying the components of a strong tribal court system is
important, the real challenge is determining how a Native nation’s court
system can improve in each of these six areas. Although many paths are
available to Native nations seeking to strengthen tribal court systems, the
remainder of this article argues that the doctrine of tribal sovereign
62. See Bethel Trustee Removed, supra note 23.
63. O’Connor, supra note 27, at 2.
64. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 163 (1803).
65. See, e.g., THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
66. See Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793, 799 (1997); contra Kenneth I. Winston, On Treating
Like Cases Alike, 62 CALIF. L. REV. 1 (1974).
67. See generally Álvaro Herrero & Gaspar López, Access to Information and Transparency
in the Judiciary: A Guide to Good Practices from Latin America, WORLD BANK (2010),
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/WBI/Resources/213798-1259011531325/65983841268250334206/Transparency_Judiciary.pdf.
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immunity is a critical tool all Native nations have. When used strategically,
tribal sovereign immunity can help build strong tribal court systems by
strengthening the six components discussed above.
IV. TRIBAL SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
Sovereign immunity, in its simplest formulation, is the right of the
sovereign to be free from being sued in court except when it consents to the
lawsuit.68 A more functional definition of sovereign immunity is a
government’s power “to define the forum, procedure, and limits respecting
[law]suits against itself.”69 The doctrine of sovereign immunity has its
origins in British common law and was considered settled law as early as
the late thirteenth century.70 It has been a part of United States
jurisprudence from the time of the country’s founding.71 Typically, the
doctrine of sovereign immunity is said to have derived from the notion that
“the King can do no wrong,”72 a precept that, historically, was not shared
by any of the Native nations living in the Americas.73
Today, federally recognized tribes enjoy the privilege of sovereign
immunity. The first Supreme Court case to mention tribal sovereign
immunity was Turner v. United States.74 Although the case did not
primarily concern the issue of tribal sovereign immunity, the Court still
recognized its application to tribes by noting that “[w]ithout authorization
from Congress, the [tribe] could not have been sued in any court; at least
without its consent.”75 It was more than twenty years later when the Court
solidified the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity in the case of United

68. Cohens v Virginia, 19 U.S. 264, 380 (1821) (“The counsel for the defendant in error . . .
have laid down the general proposition that a sovereign independent State is not suable except by
its own consent. This general proposition will not be controverted.”).
69. NNI Forum: Tribal Sovereign Immunity, NATIVE NATIONS INSTITUTE (May 14, 2007),
https://nnidatabase.org/video/nni-forum-tribal-sovereign-immunity.
70. Louis L. Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and Officers: Sovereign Immunity, 77 HARV.
L. REV. 1, 3 (1963).
71. See generally Cohens v Virginia, 19 U.S. 264 (1821); THE FEDERALIST NO. 81
(Alexander Hamilton) (“It is inherent in the nature of sovereignty not to be amenable to the suit of
an individual without its consent.”).
72. Chemerinsky, supra note 7, at 1202.
73. See NNI Forum, supra note 69 (“And so Europeans brought to this country this notion of
the doctrine of sovereign immunity, which . . . has no parallel anywhere in Indian country. I have
not studied a North American Indian tribe [that] adopted the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity
prior to 1492. In fact, in the famous words of Chief Sitting Bull when he was told about the
doctrine [in which the doctrine] was translated to mean ‘the Chief can do no wrong,’ he replied,
‘and expect to get away with it.’ In Indian country, the idea that our leaders aren’t accountable
just doesn’t fly.”).
74. 248 U.S. 354 (1919).
75. Id. at 358.
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States v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co.76 In U.S. Fidelity, the
Court held that “Indian Nations are exempt from suit without Congressional
authorization,” citing the Turner case as support.77 Over the decades, the
doctrine has been refined, but the basic principle has remained unchanged:
“federally recognized Indian tribes are immune from suit by any entity or
individual, other than the United States, absent their consent or
congressional abrogation.”78
Although tribal sovereign immunity is widely understood as an
inherent part of tribal sovereignty,79 the legal doctrine rests on shaky
ground. As an inherent part of tribal sovereignty, sovereign immunity
should be understood not as a delegation of congressional power, but as a
privilege each Native nation possessed prior to the creation of the United
States by virtue of its status as a sovereign nation. In reality, however,
tribal sovereign immunity—like all other areas of federal Indian law—is
subject to the will of Congress80 and, at least in the eyes of some, to the will
of the Supreme Court.81 It has long been held that Congress has plenary
powers over Indian affairs, including power over tribal sovereign immunity.
Thus, at any point in time, Congress could choose to limit or eliminate the
doctrine of sovereign immunity in the tribal context altogether.

76. 309 U.S. 506 (1940).
77. Id. at 512 n.11.
78. Clay R. Smith, Tribal Sovereign Immunity: A Primer, 50 THE ADVOC. 19, 19 (2007),
www.isb.idaho.gov/pdf/advocate/issues/advo7may.pdf.
79. See, e.g., Vann v. Kempthorne, 534 F.3d 741, 749 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (“the nature of tribal
sovereign immunity . . . is not the product of any enactment but an inherent attribute of a tribe’s
sovereignty. Tribal sovereign immunity existed at the Founding, as surely did tribal
sovereignty . . . .”). See also Mary-Beth Moylan, Sovereign Rules of the Game: Requiring
Campaign Finance Disclosure in the Face of Tribal Sovereign Immunity, 20 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 1,
5 (2010) (“Tribal sovereignty, including immunity to suit, is rooted in a tribe’s historical existence
preceding the formation of the United States.”); Erick J. Rohan, What Congress Gives, Congress
Takes Away: Tribal Sovereign Immunity and the Threat of Agroterrorism, 19 SAN JOAQUIN
AGRIC. L. REV. 137, 138 (2010) (“Indian tribes were recognized as sovereigns prior to the
existence of the United States which entitles them to some immunity from suit”); Andrea M.
Seielstad, The Recognition and Evolution of Tribal Sovereign Immunity Under Federal Law:
Legal, Historical, and Normative Reflections on a Fundamental Aspect of American Indian
Sovereignty, 37 TULSA L. REV. 661, 683 (2002) (“[T]he doctrine [of tribal sovereign immunity]
has long been recognized by all three branches of the federal government as an essential and
inherent element of tribal sovereignty.”). But see Smith, supra note 78, at 20 (“[Tribal sovereign]
immunity is judge-made, or federal common law, in character. It does not derive from the United
States Constitution and is subject not only to congressional control but also to federal
constitutional restrictions.”).
80. See generally Aaron F.W. Meek, Comment, The Conflict Between State Tests of Tribal
Entity Immunity and the Congressional Policy of Indian Self-Determination, 35 AM. INDIAN L.
REV. 141, 147-54 (2011).
81. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 55, Michigan v. Bay Mills Cmty., 133 U.S. 907
(2013) (No. 12-515).
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In its current form, tribal sovereign immunity has boundaries.82 First,
Native nations may not invoke sovereign immunity to avoid being sued by
the federal government.83 Additionally, the doctrine of tribal sovereign
immunity does not protect individual tribal members from suit,84 although
Native nation-owned businesses may be able to exercise the power of
sovereign immunity.85 Similar to state sovereign immunity protected by the
Eleventh Amendment, tribal sovereign immunity is also limited by the fact
that tribal officers may be sued for injunctive relief in appropriate
circumstances.86 Generally speaking though, tribal sovereign immunity’s
boundaries are located where tribes have given consent to being sued and to
where Congress has abrogated the applicability of the doctrine itself.87
Native nations can consent to being sued, thus waiving tribal sovereign
immunity. This most commonly occurs when a Native nation expressly

82. Although a complete discussion of the boundaries of tribal sovereign immunity is
beyond the scope of this paper.
See generally Smith, supra note 78, at 20 (“[Sovereign]
immunity applies to suit in federal or state court brought by any party other than the United States,
federal agency or a federal official. The immunity applies without regard to relief sought. The
immunity applies without regard to nature of the controversy itself. It therefore applies equally to
tort, contract and enforcement claims. The immunity applies without regard to where the dispute
arises . . . . The immunity applies without regard to whether the involved tribal activity is subject
to regulation under valid federal or state law. It is concerned with remedy, not with underlying
liability. The immunity may be waived by the affected tribe or abrogated by Congress. Any
waiver or abrogation must be unequivocal. Immunity ordinarily does not preclude prospective
relief against tribal officers or employees when their actions are alleged to violate federal law.
Immunity does not extend to actions taken by tribal members in their individual capacities.”).
83. See, e.g., EEOC v. Karuk Tribe Hous. Auth., 260 F.3d 1071, 1075 (9th Cir. 2001)
(“Indian tribes do not, however, enjoy sovereign immunity from suits brought by the federal
government.”); see also Padraic I. McCoy, Sovereign Immunity and Tribal Commercial Activity:
A Legal Summary and Policy Check, 57 FED. LAW. 41, 44 (2010) (“The doctrine does not shield
tribes from suits brought by the United States.”).
84. Puyallup Tribe, Inc. v. Dep’t of Game, 433 U.S. 165, 171-72 (1977) (“Second, whether
or not the Tribe itself may be sued in a state court without its consent or that of Congress, a suit to
enjoin violations of state law by individual tribal members is permissible. The doctrine of
sovereign immunity which was applied in United States v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co.,
309 U. S. 506, does not immunize the individual members of the Tribe.”).
85. Jeff M. Kosseff, Note, Sovereignty for Profits: Courts’ Expansion of Sovereign
Immunity to Tribe Owned Businesses, 5 FLA. A&M U. L. REV. 131, 138 (2009) (“[D]ecisions
from lower courts after Kiowa have extended tribal sovereignty even further: to shield for-profit
businesses that are owned by tribes and do not perform a governmental function.”). Although
Native nation-owned businesses may enjoy the privilege of exercising sovereign immunity, there
are currently a variety of tests being used by courts to determine whether tribal sovereign
immunity applies in a specific situation or not.); Meek, supra note 80, at 156-90.
86. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 59 (1978) (“As an officer of the Pueblo,
petitioner Lucario Padilla is not protected by the tribe’s immunity from suit.”); see also Vann v.
Kempthorne, 534 F.3d 741, 750 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (“Applying the principle of Ex parte Young in
the matter before us, we think it clear that tribal sovereign immunity does not bar the suit against
tribal officers.”); McCoy, supra note 83, at 44; Smith, supra note 78, at 19.
87. Kiowa Tribe v. Mfg. Techs., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 754 (1998). For an analysis of
Congress’ decisions to abrogate tribal sovereign immunity in specific contexts, see Seielstad,
supra note 79, at 717-29.
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waives its right to sovereign immunity via clear language in a legal
document or via the decision not to exercise the right at trial. A Native
nation may also impliedly waive its right to sovereign immunity in
circumstances where the nation’s actions and/or words are interpreted by a
court as consenting to a lawsuit, regardless of whether that was the nation’s
actual intent or not. For example, in C & L Enterprises, Inc. v. Citizen
Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe, the Native nation had a construction
contract with a business.88 The contract expressly stated that any disputes
would be resolved via arbitration, but made no mention of lawsuits in court.
A unanimous Supreme Court held that this type of clause was sufficient for
a Native nation to be subjected to lawsuits with respect to the arbitration
reward.89 On the other hand, in 1991, the Supreme Court, in Oklahoma Tax
Commission v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe, held that the mere
filing of an action for injunctive relief by the Native nation did not result in
a waiver of sovereign immunity and did not open up the nation to
counterclaims alleging money-damages.90
In addition to consent, Native nations may also be precluded from
relying on the doctrine of sovereign immunity when Congress has
abrogated that privilege.
Congressional legislation abrogates tribal
sovereign immunity and subjects Native nations to lawsuits only when an
“unequivocal expression” of congressional intent to do so exists.91 Absent
such an expression, tribal sovereign immunity remains intact.
Given that the doctrine of sovereign immunity is based on a
precept—“the King can do no wrong”—that is generally rejected by
democratic principles and given that the doctrine seems to run contrary to
notions of traditional Native leadership by consensus, why then does the
doctrine continue to exist? While commentators have put various
justifications of sovereign immunity forth,92 the two strongest invoke
sovereignty and fiscal considerations. Additionally, the role tradition plays
in United States jurisprudence also helps explain why, despite its detractors,
sovereign immunity remains a part of the American legal landscape.
Sovereign immunity is often justified on the basis that it is a natural
extension of a sovereign’s autonomous status.93 To be sovereign is to be
88. 532 U.S. 411 (2001).
89. Smith, supra note 78, at 19.
90. 498 U.S. 505, 516 (1991).
91. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 58 (1978).
92. See, e.g., Chemerinsky, supra note 7, at 1216 (“Six primary rationales [for sovereign
immunity] are discussed below: the importance of protecting government treasuries; separation of
powers; the absence of authority for suits against the government; the existence of adequate
alternative remedies; a curb on bureaucratic powers; and tradition.”).
93. McCoy, supra note 83, at 43.
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the source of political power from which all specific political powers are
derived.94 Thus, sovereignty includes the power to define the forum,
procedure, and limits with respect to lawsuits against the sovereign—which
is, in essence, how the doctrine of sovereign immunity functions. As
sovereigns, the federal government, 95 the states,96 and Native nations all
enjoy the benefits of sovereign immunity.97 When outside actors
acknowledge and respect a government’s exercise of sovereign immunity,
they are implicitly recognizing that government’s sovereignty. In this
sense, it has been argued that this justification for sovereign immunity is
more “likely to ring true with respect to tribal than nontribal
governments.”98
Sovereign immunity is also frequently justified on the grounds that “the
doctrine prevents burdensome financial losses that could seriously impair or
destroy governmental operations.”99 There is no question that sovereign
immunity protects governmental treasuries by preventing lawsuits for
money damages.100 This justification for the doctrine tends to be
particularly significant within the tribal context. After all, although great
strides with respect to governmental operating budgets have been made by
many Native nations, when compared to the states and the federal
government, Native nations continue to have significantly less capital and
less ability to raise capital through taxation.101 To quote one tribal court
judge, “[i]t is not long ago that the only thing standing between the nation
and bankruptcy was sovereign immunity.”102
Finally, tradition also helps explain why sovereign immunity continues
to exist within the United States legal context. As discussed above,
sovereign immunity has been a part of the United States’ legal fabric since
94. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1430 (8th ed. 2004).
95. See, e.g., Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264 (1821).
96. See generally John J. Gibbons, The Eleventh Amendment and State Sovereign Immunity:
A Reinterpretation, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1890 (1983).
97. Smith, supra note 78, at 19.
98. See Struve, supra note 8, at 166-67.
99. Tribal Sovereign Immunity: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 104th
Cong. 104 (1996) (statement of Sen. Daniel Inouye).
100. Chemerinsky, supra note 7, at 1216-17.
101. Tribal Sovereign Immunity: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 105th
Cong., 105-595 (1998) (statement of Wayne Taylor, Jr.) (“What is overlooked by those who hold
up Federal and State waivers of immunity in contrast to tribal waivers of immunity is the fact that
Federal and State governments with their huge tax bases are in a much better position to grant
broad waivers of immunity than are the Tribes which have historically been hamstrung by the lack
of a tribal tax base, partly as a result of the dual taxation problem engendered by state taxation of
transactions within Indian country, and partly as a result of struggling tribal economies which are
only now beginning to see the light of day.”).
102. Newton, supra note 54, at 338 (quoting Kingsley v. Ho-Chunk Nation, 23 Indian L.
Rep. 6113, 6117 n.3 (Ho-Chunk Tribal Ct. 1996)).
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the country’s founding.103 Even within the Native context, the Supreme
Court has explicitly recognized the doctrine for nearly a century.104 Due in
part to the United States’ common law tradition and legal principles like
stare decisis, legal changes tend to occur very slowly. Undoing centuries of
legal precedent—whether in the federal, state, or tribal context—would
undoubtedly bring with it significant and varied impacts, the likes of which
have probably aided in preventing the Supreme Court from abolishing the
doctrine in any context.105
V. TRIBAL SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY’S IMPACT ON
TRIBAL COURTS
As legal scholars and courts continue to weigh the pros and cons of
tribal sovereign immunity, the fact remains that Native nations currently
enjoy the privilege of immunity and must decide how to use this power.
Like any power, sovereign immunity is a tool that can be used to achieve
different ends. And no matter how this tool is utilized, it frequently has
consequences for tribal courts. This section examines the options Native
nations have available to them as well as the pros and cons of different
strategies with respect to tribal sovereign immunity policies.
A. TRIBAL SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY IS A TOOL THAT AFFECTS
TRIBAL COURTS
Every time tribal sovereign immunity is invoked or waived, it affects
tribal courts. When a Native nation invokes sovereign immunity and
prevents a lawsuit from moving forward, the effect on the tribal court
system is, in the immediate sense, one less case on the docket. In the longterm, if a Native nation continually invokes sovereign immunity with
respect to a certain type of cases (for example, all contract cases), then the
tribal court will fail to develop any expertise or jurisprudence in that area of
law. Conversely, when a Native nation waives sovereign immunity and
allows a case to be heard by the tribal court, the short-term effect is adding
one case to the docket, and the potential long-term effect is the development
103. See United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 208 (1882) (“And while the exemption of the
United States and of the several states from being subjected as defendants to ordinary actions in
the courts has since that time been repeatedly asserted here, the principle has never been discussed
or the reasons for it given, but it has always been treated as an established doctrine.”).
104. Turner v. United States, 248 U.S. 354, 358 (1919).
105. For a discussion of possible consequences associated with eliminating the doctrine of
tribal sovereign immunity, see Ryan Seelau & Ian Record, How Tribes Can Prepare for Tribal
Sovereignty Blow From Supreme Court, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY MEDIA NETWORK (November
8, 2013), http://indiancountrytodaymedianetwork.com/2013/11/08/sovereign-immunity-and-baymills-case-how-tribes-can-prepare.
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of expertise and jurisprudence with respect to the substantive area of law
the case concerns. These relatively straightforward strategic considerations,
when paired with innovation and time, can achieve dramatically different
results. By way of demonstrating how tribal sovereign immunity can shape
a tribal court system over time, consider two extreme situations: a Native
nation that never waives sovereign immunity and a Native nation that
always waives sovereign immunity.
In a Native nation that never waives sovereign immunity under any
circumstances, no lawsuits against the nation itself would ever be heard by
the tribal court unless authorized by Congress.106 This would likely include
lawsuits related to civil rights violations, contract disputes arising out of
Native nation-owned business, and torts arising out of injuries sustained on
nation-owned lands. Additionally, no lawsuits initiated by any of the states
against the Native nation would be heard in any forum either. Potentially, a
strategy of never waiving immunity could have the positive benefit of
providing maximum protection to the nation’s treasury. However, the same
strategy would likely also have other long-term costs. One potential cost to
the Native nation might be a tribal court system that is seen as
underutilized, unsophisticated with respect to certain critical areas of law,
unable to create a culturally appropriate jurisprudence in certain critical
areas of law, and possibly illegitimate, especially to the outside world.107
Such a court system would likely find it increasingly difficult to carry out
its purposes—advancing tribal sovereignty, empowering the other branches
of government, promoting peace and community health, and supporting
economic growth over time. Additionally, a Native nation government
always invoking tribal sovereign immunity is likely to be seen as
increasingly unfair—at least to those having to deal directly with the
nation—a situation that one would expect to produce negative economic
and relational consequences as well.108
106. Smith, supra note 78, at 19.
107. Non-Natives are often quick to label a Native court system “illegitimate” based on its
use of tribal sovereign immunity. See, e.g., Kosseff, supra note 85, at 145; Seielstad, supra note
79, at 729-35.
108. For example, one could imagine what such a policy would do in the context of Native
nations’ businesses. While the exercise of sovereign immunity by Native-nation owned
businesses tends to garner media backlash regardless of the specifics of the situation, the use of
tribal sovereign immunity in certain situations draws especially harsh attention from the media.
Among the businesses that have received extra interest from the media and commentators are
casinos, payday loan companies, and insurance companies. See Bree R. Black Horse, The Risks
and Benefits of Tribal Payday Lending to Tribal Sovereign Immunity, 1 AM. INDIAN L. J. 388,
411-12 (2013) (“Moreover, tribes should not conduct payday lending over an extended period of
time, and if a tribe elects to engage in this business, the tribe should attempt to fly under the radar
of the press, federal officials, and the courts . . . Otherwise, a misinformed tribal nation may
abrogate the right to sovereign immunity for all of Indian Country.”).
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On the opposite end of the spectrum, a Native nation that always
waives sovereign immunity could potentially have a very active court, but
one that would also carry both positive and negative consequences along
with it. For the sake of argument, I will assume that the Native nation in
question is choosing to waive every lawsuit filed against it into tribal court
without any limitations on damages.109 Potentially, this strategy would
result in some negative effects on the tribal court. On the positive side, a
tribal court operating under these circumstances would have the opportunity
to develop expertise and culturally-appropriate jurisprudence in a wide
range of substantive fields of law. This court, depending on the decisions it
makes, may also be able to produce a track record of fairness, thus
potentially increasing its legitimacy with all who interact with it. On the
negative side, a tribal court functioning under a strategy of always waiving
tribal immunity would run the risk of being overburdened, and if that were
to occur, then the effectiveness of the institution would decrease as delays
in justice would likely increase. Additionally, a strategy that allowed all
lawsuits to move forward with no limitations on damages would put the
nation’s treasury at risk and one lawsuit could, at least theoretically, cause
significant financial harm to the nation. That risk could possibly be
counteracted somewhat by the likelihood that economic development
originating from outside the reservation is more likely where sovereign
immunity waivers are possible.
In the end, neither of the extreme scenarios just discussed create an
idea situation for a Native nation. But these examples begin to illustrate
how sovereign immunity policies result in different outcomes. To put it
more succinctly: tribal sovereign immunity is a tool that can be used by
Native nations to achieve a wide variety of outcomes.

Gabe Galanda, Tribes and Insurance Defense Lawyers Should Avoid Asserting Sovereign
Immunity, NORTHWEST INDIAN LAW & BUSINESS ADVISOR, July 6, 2009,
http://www nwindianbusinesslawblog.com/2009/07/articles/oklahoma-indian-law/tribesinsurance-defense-lawyers-should-avoid-asserting-sovereign-immunity/; Kosseff, supra note 85;
David Lazarus, Tribes’ payday loans under scrutiny, LOS ANGELES TIMES, April 29, 2013,
http://articles.latimes.com/2013/apr/29/business/la-fi-lazarus-20130430.
109. This would not necessarily have to be the case. As discussed supra, sovereign
immunity is essentially the right of a sovereign to define the forum, procedure, and limits of a
lawsuit. As such, a Native nation could waive sovereign immunity and allow a case to proceed in
a state or federal court instead of its own. Likewise, a Native nation could waive sovereign
immunity and allow a case to proceed in its own court, but in doing so, cap damages. Finally, a
Native nation could waive sovereign immunity and allow a case to go to arbitration or mediation
instead of going to a trial setting. The permutations and variations available to a Native nation
waiving sovereign immunity are substantial and each carries with it different consequences.
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B. THINKING STRATEGICALLY ABOUT TRIBAL SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
That tribal sovereign immunity is a tool affecting tribal courts is
significant because, as discussed above, strong tribal courts are one of the
foundational institutions that that vast majority of Native nations exercising
real self-determination have in place. Thus, Native nations serious about
self-determination are likely going to want to contemplate how best to use
the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity to best achieve their nation’s
goals. To this end, the nation building principles offer some additional
insight. First, to use the language of the nation building principles,
although tribal sovereign immunity is not the same as tribal sovereignty, it
is an instrument of sovereignty—that is, of practical self-rule—that Native
nations can use to further their goals. Therefore, Native nations wishing to
exercise practical self-rule are going to have to make difficult decisions
about when to waive sovereign immunity and when to invoke it. When
waiving immunity, Native nations need to ensure they have effective
governing institutions—i.e., an effective court system—prepared to
adjudicate the cases that may arise. Finally, the nation building principles
suggest that a nation should approach tribal sovereign immunity with a
strategic orientation, which includes considering the nation’s values and
long-term goals.
Approaching tribal sovereign immunity strategically is critical to
understanding how the doctrine can help strengthen tribal court systems.
Within the nation building research, strategic orientation means moving
away from a reactive governance to one focused on “developing sustainable
solutions to problems.”110 A strategic approach to any issue involves
transitioning “from reactive thinking to proactive thinking,” “from shortterm thinking to long-term thinking,” “from opportunistic thinking toward
systemic thinking,” and “from a narrow problem focus to a broader societal
focus.”111 With respect to tribal sovereign immunity, shifting from reactive
and short-term thinking to proactive and long-term thinking with respect to
tribal sovereign immunity likely means shifting from the question “Can
sovereign immunity be raised in this case” to “What policy should the
nation have in place with respect to raising sovereign immunity in a case.”
Shifting from opportunistic thinking toward systemic thinking likely means
determining what the nation’s long-term goals are and how both waiving

110. Stephen Cornell et al., Seizing the Future: Why Some Native Nations Do and Others
Don’t,
NATIVE
NATIONS
INSTITUTE
1,
5
(2005),
https://nnidatabase.org/db/attachments/text/JOPNAs/2005_CORNELL_orgensen_etal_JOPNA_se
izingfuture.pdf.
111. Cornell & Kalt, supra note 14, at 16-17.
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and asserting sovereign immunity might be a tool to reach those goals.
Shifting from a narrow problem focus to a broader societal focus likely
means considering all the consequences of asserting tribal sovereign
immunity in a given context. These consequences include ramifications to
the nation’s institutions, especially its tribal court system, the legal
consequences to the nation and other Native nations, the public relations
consequences to the nation and other Native nations, and any additional
consequences that may occur both locally and globally.112
C. TRIBAL SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY WAIVERS CAN STRENGTHEN
TRIBAL COURTS
At this point, it should be clear that a Native nation’s tribal sovereign
immunity policy affects its tribal court system, but the question that remains
is how can tribal sovereign immunity be used to strengthen tribal court
systems. The reality is that the consequences of a Native nation’s tribal
sovereign immunity policy have the potential to be felt in all six of the
components required for strong tribal courts. Most significantly, any tribal
sovereign immunity policy will directly affect the capacity, jurisdiction, and
legitimacy of the tribal court associated with it, while having lesser impacts
on the areas of accountability, funding, and independence.
1.

Accountability, Funding, and Independence

The relationship between a Native nation’s tribal sovereign immunity
policy and a tribal court’s accountability, funding, and independence is
weak, but does exist. With respect to accountability and independence, the
relationship stems from the number of cases being heard by the court,
which can be controlled—to a degree—by how a Native nation utilizes the
sovereign immunity doctrine. Specifically, a tribal court system seeking to
demonstrate that it is accountable and independent will require cases
moving through the system.113 After all, there can be no demonstrated
accountability and no demonstrated independence if no disputes are being
heard. To this limited end, because a tribal sovereign immunity policy has

112. See Seiselstad, supra note 79, at 774 (“In light of the ever-present potential for change,
it is imperative that tribes take advantage of this window of opportunity to reflect on what balance
they wish to maintain between the need for immunity, on the one hand, and the need for
government accountability and the ability of citizens and others who interact with tribes to seek
enforcement of rights and redress for their injuries, on the other hand. By doing so, tribes will
strengthen the rules and institutions important to sustaining their powers of self-governance and
prepare for future attacks aimed at the integrity and fairness of their justice systems.”).
113. See, e.g., Gloria Valencia-Weber, Tribal Courts: Custom and Innovative Law, 24 N.M.
L. REV. 225, 232-23 (1994).
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an affect on the number of cases progressing through the court system, it, in
turn, has a very limited affect on these two components.
Although similarly weak in its connection, a tribal sovereign immunity
policy may also affect a tribal court system’s funding. As alluded to above,
there is a large body of empirical evidence indicating that tribal court
systems are key to Native nation economic development efforts.114 In order
for tribal court systems to be useful in such efforts, they need to be seen as
legitimate by potential investors and businesspersons.115 And, as will be
discussed in more detail, a Native nation’s sovereign immunity
policy—particularly with respect to contracts—greatly affects whether its
justice system is viewed as being fair, which is at the heart of legitimacy.
To the extent a nation’s tribal sovereign immunity policy affects investment
within the nation, it also affects the money available to fund tribal court
systems. To put it more bluntly, a tribal sovereign immunity policy that
creates an environment of fairness—particularly with respect to contract
disputes—has the potential to help improve a Native nation’s economic
situation, which could, in turn, result in additional funding available for the
tribal court system.116
2.

Capacity

A Native nation’s sovereign immunity policy can substantially affect
its court system’s capacity with respect to the types of substantive issues it
is capable of addressing. Tribal court personnel develop legal expertise by
a combination of formal education, various types of training and continuing
education programs, and in courtroom experience.117 To a substantial
degree, the types of cases that come before a tribal court system can be
controlled by how a Native nation uses tribal sovereign immunity. For
example, a nation that allows no tort cases to proceed against the nation is
likely to have a less sophisticated jurisprudence and understanding of tort
issues. At the other extreme, a nation that creates a special judicial body to
handle only tort cases filed against the nation and then uses tribal sovereign
immunity to waive those cases into this special body is more likely to have
a very sophisticated understanding of torts and a developed jurisprudence in
that substantive area. Strategically using tribal sovereign immunity in this

114.
115.
116.
117.

Jorgenson & Taylor, supra note 15, at 5.
See, e.g., Valencia-Weber, supra note 113, at 233.
Jorgenson & Taylor, supra note 15, at 5.
See Hearing, supra note 36, at 29 (statement by William Thorne, Jr.).
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manner can allow a tribal court system to hear more types of cases and
improve its capacity.118
Additionally, it is worth noting that the doctrine of tribal sovereign
immunity allows for even more subtle control over developing capacity in
the manner just discussed. Recall that tribal sovereign immunity allows
Native nations not only to choose the forum and procedure used in a
dispute, but it also allows a nation to determine its liability in such cases.
Thus, a Native nation with a relatively young court system and relatively
low capacity could strategically choose to waive sovereign immunity and
allow a wide variety of cases to proceed to tribal court, but could also cap
damages at a low level. Over time, as the tribal court system develops more
capacity, those liability limits could increase as trust in the tribal court’s
expertise and jurisprudence increases. In short, by utilizing different
forums, procedures, and liability limits, Native nations have an array of
options for developing the human capacity of their tribal court systems.
3.

Jurisdiction

Tribal court jurisdiction grows and shrinks with every waiver and
invocation of tribal sovereign immunity. As discussed above, all courts
require jurisdiction within which to operate, and there can be a difference
between a court’s de jure jurisdiction and its de facto jurisdiction. A Native
nation’s sovereign immunity policy has a particularly strong effect on a
court’s de facto jurisdiction. Every time tribal sovereign immunity is used
to prevent a case from being heard in a tribal court, that court is effectively
losing jurisdiction, at least over that case.119 And when a Native nation has
a policy whereby all cases in one substantive area are subject to tribal
sovereign immunity, that nation’s tribal court has lost de facto jurisdiction
over that substantive area of law—at least with respect to cases being filed
against the nation itself. On the other hand, when sovereign immunity is
waived and a case is allowed to proceed in tribal court, that court is
expanding its jurisdiction, at least with respect to that case. And, similarly,
if a Native nation alters its sovereign immunity policy to allow a tribal court
to hear cases in a substantive area of law previously excluded by sovereign
immunity, that trial court has substantially increased its de facto
jurisdiction.
118. See id. at 48 (statement of Sen. Daniel Inouye) (“If the capacity of the court is
diminished by inadequate funding and support, it is the sovereignty of the tribe that is diminished.
If the authority of the court is diminished by lack of regard from elevated tribal officials or the
membership of the tribe, it is the standing of the tribe that suffers.”).
119. McCoy, supra note 83, at 42 (Procedurally speaking, sovereign immunity “deprives
courts of subject matter jurisdiction,” making them unable to hear a particular case).
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To a certain extent, not waiving tribal sovereign immunity and
allowing cases to proceed in a tribal court may, over the long-term, have an
even more detrimental effect to tribal court jurisdiction. When a Native
nation invokes sovereign immunity with respect to a specific case, it does
not always follow that the case is never heard. While it is sure to never be
heard in a tribal court under such circumstances, plaintiffs regularly attempt
to file their claims in state or federal court. For the most part, these external
court systems respect the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity and dismiss
the cases,120 but occasionally external courts accept the case and hear it on
its merits.121 Sometimes, in the process of accepting such cases, state and
federal courts have chipped away at the doctrine of tribal sovereign
immunity, or tribal jurisdiction, or both.122 Thus, every time a Native
nation invokes tribal sovereign immunity—particularly in unique
contexts—there is the risk of not only losing jurisdiction over the individual
case involved, but also potentially losing more than that at the hands of
state and federal judiciaries. That does not necessarily mean a Native
nation should never invoke tribal sovereign immunity. Rather, Native
nations must realize that any decision with respect to the doctrine needs to
be strategic and needs to consider both the short-term and long-term effects
on both the tribal court system and the nation as a whole.
4.

Legitimacy

Finally, the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity can be utilized
strategically to improve both internal and external legitimacy. A strong
tribal court system thrives on legitimacy, and one crucial aspect of
legitimacy is perceived fairness.123 Both Native citizens and non-Native
120. See, e.g., N. Arapaho Tribe v. Harnsberger, 697 F.3d 1272, 1282 (10th Cir. 2012)
(“Thus, the district court correctly held that the Eastern Shoshone is a sovereign and not amenable
to suit, and that no exception to sovereign immunity permis its joinder. The Easter Shoshone
could not, therefore, feasibly be joined.”); Gilbertson v. Quinault Indian Nation, 495 F.App’x 779
(9th Cir 2012) (affirming the district court’s decision to dismiss the case based on tribal sovereign
immunity); Contour Spa at the Hard Rock, Inc. v. Seminole Tribe of Fla., 692 F.3d 1200, 1212
(11th Cir. 2012) (affirming the district court’s decision to dismiss the case based on lack of
jurisdiction).
121. See, e.g., Maxwell v. County of San Diego, 697 F.3d 941, 955 (9th Cir. 2012) (“We . . .
reverse the district court’s granting of the Viejas defendants’ motion to dismiss for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction due to tribal sovereign immunity, and remand for further proceedings.”); Agua
Caliente Band of Cahullia Indians v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. Rptr. 3d 679, 682 (Cal. Ct. App.
2004) (“The Tribe claims that, as a federally-recognized Indian tribe, it is immune from suit under
the doctrine of tribal immunity . . . We shall deny the Tribe’s petition.”).
122. See, e.g., Agua Caliente Band, 10 Cal Rptr.3d at 682 (denying the tribe’s assertion of
tribal sovereign immunity through the creation of an exception to the tribal sovereign immunity
doctrine based on the U.S. Constitution’s Article IV guarantee of a republican form of
government).
123. Valencia-Weber, supra note 113, at 237-38.
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individuals want a tribal court system that is fair.124 A fair system is
substantially more likely to be treated as legitimate than an unfair one.
And, ultimately, a Native nation’s sovereign immunity policy plays a large
role in the perceived fairness of its courts.
A fair court is one in which a wronged individual can be made whole
again. Because tribal sovereign immunity gives a Native nation the ability
to decide which cases proceed against it and which do not, exercising
sovereign immunity too frequently, or in the wrong types of cases, can very
quickly make a court seem unfair and cost it legitimacy. In a typical Native
nation, citizens may wish to bring suits against the government for things
like: civil rights violations, contract disputes, employment disputes (when
the nation is the employer), and torts that occur on nation-owned lands.
Similarly, a typical Native nation can expect non-Native individuals,
corporations, and other governments to bring suits against the nation for:
contract disputes, environmental law violations, torts that occur on nationowned lands, and tax disputes. Regardless of an individual’s citizenship,
the expectation is for an opportunity to be heard before a judicial forum,
and a Native nation’s sovereign immunity policy is going to go a long way
in deciding whether that expectation is met.
A fair court is also one with procedures in place to dispense justice in a
fashion that treats all individuals equally. Native nations without a
sovereign immunity policy are more likely to violate this aspect of fairness
because policies, by design, exist to remove individuals getting special
treatment. Thus, a Native nation that invokes sovereign immunity in all
contract disputes and a Native nation that waives sovereign immunity in all
contract disputes both have procedures in place that treat all individuals
equally. Although the nation invoking sovereign immunity in all contract
disputes may have to deal with the illegitimacy concerns just discussed,
neither nation in this example can be accused of treating one individual
differently from another. But some Native nations lack sovereign immunity
policies, and for these nations invoking and waiving sovereign immunity is
done on a case-by-case basis. The danger with such a policy is that it
results in one contract case being heard in tribal court and another being
turned away. Over time, this type of differential treatment can take a toll on
a tribal court’s legitimacy, the likes of which can be very difficult to recover
from.

124. Tribal Court Systems and Indian Civil Rights Act: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on
Indian Affairs, 100th Cong. 702-139 (1988) (statement of Sen. Daniel Evans) (“An essential
litmus test for any judicial system is the faith and respect it earns from those over whom it
presides. For democracy cannot truly be served without a just and trusted judicial system.”).
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Finally, a fair court must dispense justice consistently—meaning
similar cases must be decided similarly.125 Fairness, in this sense, stems
from a track record of respected decisions. In order to achieve this track
record, a tribal court system requires: cases, time, and well-reasoned
decisions. While a Native nation’s sovereign immunity policy cannot
guarantee the latter, it once again plays a significant role with respect to the
first two requirements. The more cases a tribal court system is able to hear
in a given area of law, the more likely, over time, the court system will be
able to develop the track record necessary to show that fairness. Again,
because tribal sovereign immunity acts as a gatekeeper over certain types of
cases and whether they ever make it to court, how a nation uses the doctrine
can have an immense impact on legitimacy.
VI. TRIBAL SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY AND TRIBAL COURTS:
THREE CASE STUDIES
Not only is it the case that a Native nation’s tribal sovereign immunity
policy will affect tribal courts in a myriad of ways, but, if used strategically,
the nation’s policy can strengthen tribal courts and, in turn, the entire
nation. In order to support this argument, I offer three case studies. Each
case study was chosen based on one criterion—the Native nation discussed
in the study possesses a tribal court system widely regarded as among the
strongest in Indian country. Each study presents a brief overview of the
Native nation’s court system, a brief explanation of its codified sovereign
immunity policies, and a description of at least some of the strategic
thinking the nation has gone through with respect to the doctrine as well as
the fruits that strategy has produced. While these case studies neither
provide empirical data on the connection between tribal sovereign
immunity and strong tribal court systems nor establish any causal
connection between a specific tribal sovereign immunity policy and the
strength of a specific tribal court, they are included because they reinforce
many of the arguments put forth in this paper. Additionally, these case
studies introduce the reader to some innovative ways Native nations are
approaching sovereign immunity today.
A. MISSISSIPPI BAND OF CHOCTAW INDIANS
The Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians (“Choctaw Nation”) is a
federally recognized tribe of approximately 8,300 members with 24,000
125. Valencia-Weber, supra note 113, at 237 (“The court, over time, should produce
decisions that manifest a consistency with guiding principles that evoke respect and obedience.”).
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acres of non-contiguous land scattered throughout the state of
Mississippi.126 Little more than half a century ago, the Choctaw Nation
possessed no industry, possessed no infrastructure necessary to attract
economic development, had an unemployment rate over 75%, suffered from
extensive and serious health issues,127 had exceptionally low graduation
rates, and saw many of its people leave the reservation lands in order to find
opportunities elsewhere.128 Today, however, the Choctaw Nation looks
very different. The Choctaw Nation is now the largest employer in
Neshoba County and in the state of Mississippi.129 Unemployment has
dropped substantially, and “dependen[ce] on transfer payments such as
general welfare assistance from the federal government has dropped
dramatically.”130 The Choctaw Nation now runs a myriad of businesses
from construction services to a casino and golf course to an auto parts
manufacturing facility to a printing plant.131 The Choctaw Nation provides
many governmental services to its people, including law enforcement,
courts, water, sewage, housing, and roads.132 In sum, the Mississippi
Choctaw have made great strides towards their stated goal of selfsufficiency over the past five decades.133

126. Sovereign Immunity Oversight Hearing to Provide for Indian Legal Reform: Hearing
Before the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 105th Cong. 350 (1998) (testimony of Chief Philip Martin,
Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians) (hereinafter cited as “Testimony of Chief Phillip Martin”).
This section draws heavily from the testimony of Chief Philip Martin, who was chief of the
Choctaw nation from 1979-2007. Chief Martin’s testimony took place before Congress on March
11, 1998, and in order to maintain consistency, I have elected to rely on facts and figures about the
Choctaw nation from that general time frame. However, there is ample evidence that the
successes of the Choctaw nation referenced in Chief Martin’s 1998 testimony continue to play out
to this day. See, e.g., Harvard Project on American Indian Economic Development, Choctaw
Tribal
Court
System
,
NATIVE
NATIONS
INSTITUTE
(2006),
http://nnidatabase.org/db/attachments/text/honoring_nations/2005_HN_Choctaw_tribal_court_sys
tem.pdf; Dennis Hevesi, Philip Martin, Who Led His Tribe to Wealth, Is Dead at 83, N.Y. TIMES,
February 15, 2010, http://www nytimes.com/2010/02/15/us/15martin html?_r=0 (“Phillip Martin,
a former chief of the Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians, who guided his tribe from grinding
poverty in the red clay hills of east central Mississippi to become proprietor of one of the state’s
leading business empires . . . .”).
127. Harvard Project on American Indian Economic Development, Choctaw Health Center,
NATIVE NATIONS INSTITUTE 1, 1 (1999),
http://nnidatabase.org/db/attachments/
text/honoring_nations/1999_HN_Choctaw_health_center.pdf (“In the 1960s, members of the
Mississippi Band of Choctaw subsisted in miserable economic and health conditions. Nearly all
tribal housing was substandard (90 percent of tribal members lived in units with no plumbing and
30 percent had no electricity), life expectancy was less than 50 years of age, and the Tribe’s infant
mortality rate was among the highest in the United States.”).
128. See generally Testimony of Chief Philip Martin, supra note 126.
129. Id. at 353.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
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Court System

The Choctaw Nation’s award-winning tribal court system certainly
played a role in the nation’s turnaround over the past few decades.134 The
Choctaw Nation’s court system was established in 1974. The court system
was designed to be politically independent, with oversight equally divided
between the executive and judicial branches. It was also designed to attract
qualified candidates via qualifications laid out in the Choctaw Tribal Code
and ethical candidates via the Rules of Ethics and Conduct that bound all
judicial employees.135 In 1997, the court system underwent a major reform
process, the goal of which was “to become a full-service court system
capable of handling a wide variety of cases effectively, to deepen the
system’s grounding in Choctaw practices and law, and to grow the pool of
prospective court personnel, so that the supply of Choctaw court services
could keep pace with the rising demand.”136 The reform produced the
current Choctaw Nation court system—a four-branch system with a civil
division, criminal division, juvenile peacemaker division, and youth
division. The result of the Choctaw Nation’s efforts is a judicial system
that “stands as a testament to the necessary power that consistent,
competent, and culturally appropriate justice systems provide to support
and promote a Native nation’s community and economy.”137
2.

Tribal Sovereign Immunity Policies

The Choctaw Nation’s general provision on tribal sovereign immunity
is found in their tribal code. The provision defines when sovereign
immunity has been waived and how it can be waived. Specifically, the
provision reads:
Except as expressly abrogated by act of Congress, or as
specifically waived by resolution or ordinance of the Tribal
Council specifically referring to such, the Tribe shall be immune
from suit in any civil action, and its officers and employees
immune from suit for any liability arising from the performance of
their official duties.138
Additionally, the Choctaw Nation has other portions in their code that
explicitly waive sovereign immunity, the most notable being the Choctaw
Torts Claim Act, which reads in part: “the immunity of the Tribe for
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.

Choctaw Tribal Court System, supra note 126, at 1.
Id. at 1-2.
Id. at 2.
Id. at 3.
C.T.C § 1-5-4 (2014).
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monetary damages arising out of acts of the Tribe, or acts of employees of
the Tribe, is hereby waived . . . provided, however, immunity of the Tribe
in any such case shall be waived only to the extent of the maximum amount
of liability provided for [by statute.]”139 Later in the Act, the sole forum for
such claims is defined as the Choctaw Tribal Court.140
3.

Tribal Sovereign Immunity in Action

The Choctaw Nation has utilized the doctrine of tribal sovereign
immunity to varying degrees over the years. In 1998, then-Chief, Philip
Martin told Congress:
The success the Tribe has achieved would have never been
possible without tribal sovereign immunity. Tribal immunity from
suit has played an essential role in the preservation of our
autonomous political existence and has safeguarded our tribal
assets. It has also allowed us to develop institutions of
self-government, realize self-sufficiency and participate in
mainstream society.141
But what did Chief Martin’s words mean—how was the Choctaw
Nation able to use sovereign immunity strategically to reach its economic
goals? First, the Choctaw Nation realized that a long-term commercial
relationship was “not [a question] of legal defenses or legal rights and legal
immunities and jurisdiction,” but rather a question of trust.142 With this
understanding, the Choctaw Nation treated sovereign immunity as a tool
that could be used to garner or destroy outsider trust in the nation.
According to Chief Martin, when the Choctaw Nation began pursuing
economic development, they understood that “outsiders would not do
business with tribes if it was not in their own economic self-interest to do
so.”143 Thus, the ability to negotiate waivers of immunity with lenders,
contractors, and other business entities was an essential tool in promoting
trust and, ultimately, economic development. Without such waivers,
“[p]arties interested in conducting business with the Choctaws would not

139. C.T.C § 25-1-3(1) (2014).
140. C.T.C. § 25-1-7(1) (2014).
141. Testimony of Chief Philip Martin, supra note 126, at 353.
142. Id. at 356.
143. Id. at 355. See also Tribal Sovereign Immunity: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on
Indian Affairs, 104th Cong. 694-137 (1996) (statement of Susan Williams) (“In the commercial
context, tribes have a built-in incentive to waive their immunity from suit or otherwise protect
non-Indians. Interested parties will not be interested in conducting business on Indian
reservations without an ability to seek redress for grievances. Tribes, thus, will choose to waive
immunity or take other similar steps to consummate a business deal.”).
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have entered into . . . agreements had there been no legal ability to seek
redress for grievances.”144
Waiving sovereign immunity to help foster a business relationship was
only the start from the Choctaw Nation’s perspective. After waiving
immunity, the next step was to perform on the promise—not only in the
sense of adhering to the terms of the contract, but also maintaining the
waiver of sovereign immunity in the case of a contractual breach. The goal
was to show that the trust put in the Choctaw Nation by outsiders was
well-founded. Trust was essential because it was only by building a
long-term track record with lenders and business parties that ultimately
allowed the Choctaw Nation to succeed. Again, seeing sovereign immunity
as a tool capable of cultivating or destroying trust is what guided the
Choctaw Nation:
Had we not lived up to our end of the deals and hid behind
sovereign immunity had our partners come to seek redress,
however, we would have destroyed our standing with the outside
business community and could have never obtained the financing
we needed to build and develop our commercial enterprises.145
The Choctaw Nation understood that the free-market—in the
long-term—would naturally favor those entities (whether business or
governmental) capable of being trusted. Waiving sovereign immunity can
be, at least for some Native nations, an important tool in building that trust.
Stated differently, for the Choctaw Nation, waiving sovereign immunity
and adhering to their promises was not only “the right thing to do” but was
also “in [the Choctaw Nation’s] best interests to do so.”146
As the Choctaw Nation grew stronger economically, institutionally,
and politically, the tribe changed how it used sovereign immunity as a tool.
For instance, although the Choctaw Nation had few assets to worry about
protecting when they first began their economic development process, such
a position soon changed. When it did, the Choctaw Nation’s method of
waiving sovereign immunity strategically changed as well. Instead of
granting full waivers of immunity that potentially could place all tribal
assets at risk with any contract—no matter how large or small the scope of
the particular contract was—the Choctaw Nation began strategically
limiting the immunity waiver to a specific dollar amount. For example, if
the Choctaw Nation’s investment in the project was set at two million

144. Testimony of Chief Philip Martin, supra note 126, at 355.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 354.
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dollars, then the waiver would be for that amount.147 This would allow
recovery, in the case of a breach, of up to that amount in court. With such
waivers, the Choctaw Nation is “working toward a win-win” because “both
sides have to have a good deal” in order for business to succeed.148 These
types of waivers allow trust to be forged while simultaneously safeguarding
tribal assets.149
In the end, the Choctaw Nation used tribal sovereignty strategically
over the course of decades to realize its own cultural, economic and
political goals. As the nation grew and changed, so did its use of tribal
sovereign immunity. From day one, however, the strategy was always
long-term in its vision, and the nation continually sought to use tribal
sovereign immunity waivers to build a track record of trust that would
benefit the Choctaw Nation in the future.
B. TULALIP TRIBE
The Tulalip Tribes’ reservation is located in Washington state, about
forty miles north of Seattle. The Tulalip Reservation was reserved for the
use and benefit of Indian tribes and bands signatory to the 1855 Treaty of
Point Elliott. It was established to provide a permanent home for the
Snohomish, Snoqualmie, Skagit, Suiattle, Samish, and Stillaguamish Tribes
and allied bands living in the region.150 Today, the Tulalip Tribes are
comprised of more than 4,000 citizens and are continuing to grow in
numbers.151

147. As Philip Martin described it,
Just as important as our ability to assert immunity from suit has been our right to
negotiate waivers of immunity with lenders, contractors and other non-Indian business
entities. Like all sovereigns—ranging raging from the United States of America to the
City of Philadelphia, MS—we have had to necessarily waive our sovereign immunity
to induce third parties to enter into contracts with us. The Choctaws believe that this
basic free enterprise or freedom of contract approach to addressing the tribal immunity
issue is both the most economically efficient and the best way to protect our people. A
private party negotiating a contract with a sovereign tribe is in the best position to
determine what terms of a deal are and are not acceptable, just as they are in
negotiating a contract with anyone else . . . From our experience and standpoint, this
contract approach is the most effective way for a tribe to negotiate with non-Indians
and has worked very well for us.
Testimony of Chief Philip Martin, supra note 126, at 303
148. Id. at 36.
149. Id. at 355.
150. Harvard Project on American Indian Economic Development, Tulalip Alternative
Sentencing
Program,
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1,
1
(2006),
http://nnidatabase.org/db/attachments/text/honoring_nations/2006_HN_Tulalip_alternative_senten
cing_program.pdf.
151. Tulalip Tribes, TULALIP TRIBES, http://www.tulaliptribes-nsn.gov/.
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Court System

The Tulalip Tribes’ court system grew out of the award-winning
Northwest Intertribal Court System (“NICS”).152 NICS is a consortium
created in 1979 by thirteen western Washington tribes and was founded to
assist Native nations in establishing tribal court systems. NICS continues to
provide a variety of services to Native nations, including court services to
Native nations that are unable to run their own courts and technical
assistance to Native nations developing or wishing to improve their own
court systems.153 Currently, NICS “administers the judicial functions of the
Tulalip Justice System including the two trial court judges and Appellate
Court services.”154 The Tulalip Tribes’ court system is renown for a
number of reasons that have been written about extensively elsewhere.
First, the Tulalip Tribes were able to have criminal jurisdiction retroceded
back to it in the year 2000, which allowed the nation to begin exercising
control over crime in their territory that had run rampant.155 Second, the
Tulalip Tribes were able to take that jurisdiction and exercise sovereignty
over it with great skill, not only by drastically reducing criminal activity,
but also by treating the causes of the criminal actions.156 Growing out of
that work, the Tulalip Tribes have also been recognized for their alternative
sentencing program, which has proven to be an integral cog in the wheel of
their culturally legitimate and effective justice system.157
2.

Tribal Sovereign Immunity in Action

The Tulalip Tribes’ policies with respect to sovereign immunity are
extensive and are discussed infra as part of the study on how the nation

152. Harvard Project on American Indian Economic Development, Northwest Intertribal
Court
System,
NATIVE
NATIONS
INSTITUTE
1,
1
(2003),
http://nnidatabase.org/db/attachments/text/honoring_nations/2003_HN_NW_Intertribal_Court_Sy
stem.pdf.
153. Id.
154. Leah Catherine Shearer, Justice in Indian Country: A Case Study of the Tulalip Tribes
(2011) (unpublished M.A. thesis, UCLA), http://turtletalk files.wordpress.com/2012/02/justice-inindian-country-a-casestudy-of-the-tulalip-tribes1.pdf.
155. 65 Fed. Reg. 75,948 (Nov. 29, 2000).
156. Tribal Courts and the Administration of Justice in Indian County: Hearing Before S.
Comm. of Indian Affairs, 110th Cong. 576-26 (2008) (statement of Theresa Pouley) (“In five
years, the Tulalip Tribal Court has gone from what some characterized as a lawless reservation
with rampant drug and alcohol deaths on our highways, to a very safe community. They did that
to ensure the economic development of the community, but they also did that by prioritizing the
tribal justice system.”).
157. Harvard Project on American Indian Economic Development, Tulalip Alternative
Sentencing
Program,
NATIVE
NATIONS
INSTITUTE
1,
1
(2007),
https://nnidatabase.org/db/attachments/text/honoring_nations/2006_HN_Tulalip_alternative_sente
ncing_program.pdf.
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strategically uses the doctrine today. As previously discussed, invoking
sovereign immunity does not always keep a Native nation out of court.
Sometimes even when a Native nation invokes sovereign immunity, the
nation still ends up in state or federal court. And when they do, they are
often accompanied by discussions of how the Native nation is being unfair
or unjust. Non-Native courts are frequently in agreement with the
plaintiff’s sense of injustice and frequently the courts either find ways to
imply a waiver of tribal sovereign immunity so that the case can go
forward158 or, if nothing else, find time to explicitly mention the unjust use
of sovereign immunity in the decision itself.159 In response to such
challenges, the Tulalip Tribes have realized that, when a nation’s sovereign
immunity policy is developed strategically and thoughtfully, it can address
many of the concerns frequently raised in opposition to the doctrine.
Specifically, well-crafted laws and codes about sovereign immunity can
manage the expectations of all parties who interact with Native nations,
create a system where justice is served for all, and provide absolute clarity
to outside courts that may wish to waive (or uphold) tribal sovereign
immunity against the nation’s wishes.
While wrestling with the myriad of issues surrounding tribal sovereign
immunity, the Tulalip Tribes came to the realization that both exercising
and waiving sovereign immunity in different contexts can strengthen a
nation’s sovereignty. This philosophy is perhaps best expressed by Michael
Taylor, an attorney for the Tulalip Tribes, who said:
Sovereignty is a power. Sovereign immunity is a part of that
power. And whether you’re waiving it, or asserting it, or writing it
into an ordinance or a contract or whatever it is, you are exercising
it. And . . . waiver strengthens it. It strengthens it by actually
showing that you have it and [are] putting it out there in whatever
form.160
The idea conveyed by Taylor is simple in principle: if sovereign
immunity is always waived or never waived, then the power loses much of
its meaning and usefulness. It is only through the decision to exercise
sovereign immunity in some instances and the decision to waive sovereign
immunity in other situations that the power, as an aspect of sovereignty,
158. See, e.g., C & L Enter., Inc., v. Citizen Band of Potawatomi Tribe, 532 U.S. 411
(2001).
159. See, e.g., Filer v. Tohono O’odham Nation Gaming Enter., 129 P.3d 78, 84-85 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 2006).
160. Michael Taylor, Nation-Owned Enterprises: Quil Ceda Village, NATIVE NATIONS
INSTITUTE, https://nnidatabase.org/db/video/michael-taylor-nation-owned-businesses-quil-cedavillage.
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really carries any value and can be used to achieve different strategic ends.
With this understanding in mind, the Tulalip Tribal Codes (“TTC” or
“Code”) have been carefully developed to achieve the nation’s own specific
goals.
Even a cursory glance at the TTC provides insight into the Tulalip
Tribes’ strategy with respect to sovereign immunity. The 2012 version of
the Code is more than 1,000 pages in length and is divided into fifteen
separate titles.161 All fifteen titles contain at least one reference to tribal
sovereign immunity,162 and, in total, more than fifty different sections
throughout the Code reference the doctrine. The mere fact that a large
amount of space is dedicated to tribal sovereign immunity demonstrates the
importance of the doctrine to the Tulalip Tribes, an assumption supported
by the text itself in TCC section 2.35.010(2), which asserts that “[t]ribal
sovereign immunity serves an important function in preserving limited
Tribal resources so that the Tribes can continue to provide governmental
services which promote health, safety, welfare and economic security for
the residents of and visitors to the lands of the Tribes.”
A more careful examination of the Code provides additional insight
into the Tulalip Tribes’ strategies and policies surrounding tribal sovereign
immunity. In some instances, the Tulalip nation is making it clear that their
decision to act in a specific field of law does not equate to a waiver of
sovereign immunity. For example, provisions such as TCC sections
4.10.380 and 7.15.050, which deal with sex offender registry and
environmental infractions, respectively, have blanket language that clearly
preserves sovereign immunity for the nation: “The sovereign immunity of
the Tulalip Tribes shall in no matter be waived by this chapter.”163 These
types of provisions give tribal members, outsiders, and courts notice that the
Tulalip nation’s sovereign immunity remains intact for suits in these areas.
In contrast, other provisions of the TCC very clearly, and carefully,
waive sovereign immunity under certain circumstances. For instance, in the
field of tort liability—an area where many non-Native courts and press like
to attack sovereign immunity—the Tulalip Tribes first recognized its need
to balance the provision of “governmental services which promote health,
safety and economic security” with also providing “a remedy to private
persons who are injured by negligent or wrongful acts or omissions of the
161. Tulalip Tribal Codes: A Codification of the General Ordinances of the Tulalip Tribes,
CODE PUBLISHING COMPANY (2012), http://www.codepublishing.com/wa/Tulalip/?f (hereinafter
referred to as “TCC”).
162. See, e.g., TCC §§ 1.25.030; 2.10.180; 3.22.490; 4.25.070; 5.25.050; 6.10.070;
7.15.050; 8.20.040; 9.05.590; 10.35.150; 11.05.170; 12.20.130; 13.05.060; 14.15.130; 15.20.070.
163. TCC § 8.20.040.
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Tribes or its agents, employees or officers.”164 In order to achieve this
balance, the nation established a “limited waiver of Tribal sovereign
immunity”165 that allowed “action[s] for monetary damages” to be brought
in Tribal Court subject to a number of limitations,166 most notably that “[n]o
monetary damages shall be awarded . . . in excess of the limits of insurance
maintained by the Tribes to compensate for [the] injury claimed.”167
The decision to waive sovereign immunity was not an accidental one,
but one that the Tulalip Tribes saw as in their own best interest. As
Michael Taylor explained:
[I]f you followed the process, and if you’ve been injured by the
tribe, you’re going to be paid something to make you whole. And
as a hospitality entity we’ve got to do that. If people fall off the
curb at the casino parking lot, and it’s our fault, and they injure
themselves, it’s quickly going to be known around the region that
you shouldn’t go to the Tulalip casino because if you fall off the
curb and hurt yourself, the tribe is going to raise sovereign
immunity and you can’t collect anything. So people aren’t going
to come.168
Additionally, even though the Tulalip Tribes decided to waive
sovereign immunity, they realized that they had a choice about what forum
the case would be heard in after immunity had been waived. With respect
to tort claims, the Tulalip Tribes strategically chose to only waive immunity
into its own tribal courts, and, again, it was not an accidental decision. “We
put a lot of work into [the] tribal court,” continues Taylor. “[The Harvard
Project on American Indian Economic Development] gave us an award
recently. Our tribal court is good. We’ve got good judges, we’ve got good
court of appeals, and we’ve got good ordinances.”169 The Tribes’ decision
to use its own courts not only provides a remedy for those who are injured,
but also strengthens the legitimacy of their own courts in the process.
Outside the context of torts, the Tulalip Tribes also created other areas
where specific waivers of sovereign immunity have been granted by the
Code.170 Many of these waivers relate to nation-owned businesses or
governmental corporations. In the TCC, title 15 covers governmental
entities such as governmental corporations. Within title 15, there are
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.

TCC § 2.35.010(3).
Id.
See TCC § 2.35.050.
TCC § 2.35.030.
Taylor, supra note 160.
Id.
See, e.g., TCC 9.10.060; 15.05.110.
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provisions related to, for example, the Tulalip Construction Company and
the Tulalip Telecommunications Company, both of which are wholly
owned by the Tulalip Tribes.171 And both companies have carefully crafted
waivers of immunity:
The Tulalip Construction Company is a legal creation of the
Tulalip Tribes and is subject to the jurisdiction, laws, and
ordinances of the Tribes. This chapter shall be deemed to be a
waiver by the Tribes of sovereign immunity from suit only with
respect to the telecommunication company and its separate assets,
and may only be enforced in accordance with the charter of the
Tribes’ Federal corporation. Nothing in this chapter shall be
deemed or construed to be a waiver of sovereign immunity from
suit on the part of the Tulalip Tribes, or to allow any action against
any of its assets, or to be a consent of the Tribes to the jurisdiction
of any state with regard to the business or affairs of the Tribes, or
to any cause of action, case of controversy, or other claim, except
as unequivocally and expressly set forth herein.172
These waivers purposefully allow the corporations to answer for any
wrongs they commit or debts they owe without putting the nation’s treasury
at risk.
Other provisions of the TCC handle sovereign immunity in a different
way still. In some instances, the Code states that there is no automatic
waiver within a given context, but then goes on to state that the power to
waive has been delegated to a specific entity and, furthermore, lays out the
procedure the entity must follow to legally effect a waiver of sovereign
immunity. For instance, chapter 6.05 vests the Tulalip Tribal Housing
Department with the ability to “waive any immunity from suit” so long as
the contract has first been approved by Board of Directors of the Tulalip
Tribes.173 Similarly, chapter 15.20 permits sovereign immunity to be
waived with respect to the Tulalip Forestry Enterprise, an “enterprise of the
Tulalip Indian Tribes,”174 but only if an “express and unequivocal
resolution of the Tulalip Board” exists, and even then, the waiver is “only to
the extent specified in such resolution.”175 The strategic decision to spell
out in detail how immunity may be waived in such situations ensures that
all parties interacting with the nation—including non-Native courts—are

171.
172.
173.
174.
175.

TCC §§ 15.15.050; 15.25.050.
TCC § 15.15.050.
TCC § 6.05.050(5)(c).
TCC § 15.20.70.
TCC § 15.20.080(12).
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aware of what does and does not constitute a waiver of sovereign immunity
in different contexts.
The Tulalip Tribes’ decision to create places in their Code where
sovereign immunity is not automatically waived, but which may be waived,
gives the nation maximum flexibility to deal with different situations that
arise. Generally speaking, the Tulalip Tribes waive sovereign immunity
when asked to do so, but the Code’s malleability allows for case-by-case
determinations.176 Thus, in the rare circumstances in which the Tulalip
nation is asked to waive sovereign immunity, but doing so is seen as an
affront to the nation’s sovereignty, the nation will not waive their right.
According to Taylor:
When do you not waive your immunity? When . . . you see it as
an attack on your tribal sovereignty[.] We’re building a hotel now.
[The construction company] wanted a waiver of immunity. And
we said, “Fine.” And we worked, and worked, and worked on this
waiver of immunity, and . . . in the middle they said, “We want
state court.” We did an arbitration provision, which allowed
disputes to be arbitrated by an appropriate arbitrator. But
arbitration awards have to be enforced by a court. There has to be
a court out there that will enforce the ruling of the arbitrator. The
arbitrator doesn’t have judicial authority. The arbitrator can, under
the contract, act like a judge, make an award to one side or the
other, but if one side or the other won’t follow the direction of the
arbitrator, the ruling of the arbitrator, you have to have a court at
the end. [The company] said to us, “We won’t accept your tribal
court. You have to waive immunity in state court.” So, we got
another contractor. We just finally said, “We’re not doing it.” . . .
Our tribal court is good.177
Finally, the Tulalip Tribes’ sovereign immunity provisions achieve one
more end. Not only do they state when sovereign immunity has been
waived, when it has not, and how it might be waived in certain future
instances, but the TCC also has multiple provisions clarifying which
individuals and entities are covered by sovereign immunity and which are
not. Littered throughout the Code are provisions that expressly extend
sovereign immunity to protect, for example, the Enrollment Committee and
others associated with making enrollment decisions,178 the Tribal Gaming

176. Taylor, supra note 160.
177. Id.
178. TCC § 5.05.160.
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Commission,179 the Executive Director and Tribal staff when they are
acting pursuant to Title 11 of the TCC, which relates to garbage disposal
and sanitary land fill issues,180 and the port of Tulalip, which houses the
nation’s marina operations.181
It is clear that the TCC has been carefully developed to ensure that the
world is aware of when tribal sovereign immunity has and has not been
waived, who is covered by tribal sovereign immunity within the Tulalip
nation, and who has the power to waive tribal immunity as well as the
process required for a waiver to be effective. The Tribes’ decision to spell
out the answers to these points in their code and to make their code
available publicly online,182 gives everyone interacting with the opportunity
to understand what rights and privileges do and do not exist when dealing
with the nation. When the rules are clearly spelled out and accessible, then
those interacting with the nation are on notice about the state of the law.
And when people are on notice of the law, concerns about due process
violations, equal protection violations, and injustice begin to lessen because
expectations are being managed. This management of expectations is,
ultimately, one of the strongest assets the comprehensive handling of
sovereign immunity in the TCC has to offer.
C. GRAND TRAVERSE BAND OF OTTAWA AND CHIPPEWA INDIANS
The Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa and Chippewa Indians (“GTB”) is
a federally recognized tribe located in northern Michigan. GTB has
approximately 4,100 citizens, about 17% of which live on reservation
land.183 GTB was the first tribe recognized by the federal government in
Michigan and opened one of the first casinos on tribal land.184
1.

Court System

Among GTB’s many accomplishments is an award-winning court
system. GTB’s court opened in 1988, but only served the community on a
part-time basis. Little by little, GTB invested in their court system, and
today it includes both a trial court comprised of two justices and an

179. TCC § 10.05.060(2).
180. TCC § 11.05.170.
181. TCC § 15.30.010(2).
182. Tulalip Tribal Codes, supra note 161.
183. Kristine L. Petoskey, Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa & Chippewa Indians Waste
Management
Plan,
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TRAVERSE
BAND
OF
INDIANS
1
(2010),
http://www.gtbindians.org/downloads/iswmpweb2.pdf.
184. Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Race and American Indian Tribal Nationhood, 11 WYO. L.
REV. 295, 313 (2011).
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appellate court comprised of three justices.185 GTB also has invested
resources into developing more culturally appropriate dispute resolution
mechanisms to be used in specific types of cases. Ultimately, the tribal
court system at GTB became its own branch of government, giving it the
independence necessary to carry out its purpose.186
2.

Tribal Sovereign Immunity Policies

GTB, unlike the other two cases examined, addresses the issue of
sovereign immunity in their constitution. Article XIII of the GTB
Constitution is entitled “Sovereign Immunity,” and Section One of that
Article states that GTB is immune from suit “except as authorized by this
Article or in furtherance of tribal business enterprises upon a resolution
approved by an affirmative vote of five (5) of the seven (7) members of the
Tribal Council.” Among the authorized waivers of sovereign immunity
found in the GTB Constitution is a provision that allows suits against
government officials “in the tribal court system by tribal members for the
purpose of enforcing rights and duties established by this Constitution and
by the ordinances and resolutions of the Tribe.”187 In addition to these
constitutional statements, GTB’s legal code, much like the TCC, repeatedly
references sovereign immunity and whether it is reserved or waived in
various circumstances.
3.

Tribal Sovereign Immunity in Action

GTB, along with the majority of the Native nations in Michigan, have
come to realize that tribal sovereign immunity, particularly in the taxation
context, does not have to be a wedge that drives the state and Native nations
further apart, as is so often the case. Instead, it can actually be a tool to
bring the two parties together at the bargaining table to hash out agreements
on a wide range of issues, including taxation and other types of regulation.
In fact, Native nations across the country have entered into hundreds of
agreements with states on taxation matters over the years.188 These
185. Harvard Project on American Indian Economic Development, Tribal Court of the
Grand
Traverse
Band,
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INSTITUTE
1,
1
(2000),
https://nnidatabase.org/db/attachments/text/honoring_nations/1999_HN_Grand_Traverse_Band_tr
ibal_court.pdf.
186. Id.
187. CONSTITUTION OF THE GRAND TRAVERSE BAND OF OTTAWA AND CHIPPEWA INDIANS
(1988) art. XIII, sec. 1, http://narf.org/nill/Codes/gtcode/constitution.pdf.
188. State and Federal Tax Policy: Building New Markets in Indian Country: Hearing
Before the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 112th Cong. 619-30 (2011) (statement of Steven J. Gunn);
Sovereign Immunity: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 105th Cong. 303-374
(1998) (statement of Pres. Ron Allen, National Congress of American Indians) (“[M]ore than 200
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agreements would likely not be possible if the doctrine of sovereign
immunity did not exist. But what makes the agreements made between
Michigan and several Michigan Native nations, including GTB, truly
unique is that through the strategic use of sovereign immunity, GTB and the
other nations were able to substantially increase their tribal court
jurisdiction. This increased jurisdiction allows the GTB tribal court to hear
any case where Michigan is a party and the dispute is related to the tax
agreement.
Generally speaking, current law allows states to impose taxes on
non-Indians who make purchases of certain commodities—such as gasoline
and tobacco—when those purchases occur on Native nation lands.189
Although there are restrictions, the state may legally require Native nations
to collect those taxes on behalf of the state. While states may legally
require Native nations to collect the tax, states are unable to sue Native
nations in an attempt to recover that tax due to the doctrine of tribal
sovereign immunity.190 This, understandably, has caused much friction
between states and Native nations. However, the fact that states cannot sue
for recovery also gives states an incentive to sit down and talk to Native
nations.
At first glance, it may be unclear why Native nations would want to sit
down and talk to states about taxation when they could merely collect taxes
on the reservation and use sovereign immunity to keep the money.
Although some Native nations may gladly talk out of a spirit of cooperation
or to keep positive state-tribal relationships, others would presumably see
no apparent benefit in bargaining with the state. The reality of the situation,
however, is that if Native nations are unwilling to consult with states, then
two possible outcomes become likely. First, if Native nations are unwilling
to negotiate with states, then states have shown they will take it upon
themselves to try to find new ways to indirectly collect the tax revenue from
Native nations or from nonmembers making purchases from Native nations,
which “creates the potential for double of triple taxation” and “imposes
hardships on nonmembers and tribes.”191 Second, due to the “uncertainty in
existing federal law over the precise extent of state and local taxing
authority over nonmembers in Indian country,” lawsuits become

tribes in 18 states have created successful state-tribal compacts” as of 1998); Fletcher, supra note
49.
189. Hearing, supra note 188, at 31 (statement by Steven J. Gunn) (“[T]he courts have
upheld state taxes on cigarette sales to nonmembers, state severance taxes on oil and gas produced
by nonmembers in Indian country.”).
190. See generally Kiowa Tribe. v. Mfg. Techs., Inc., 523 U.S. 751 (1998).
191. Hearing, supra note 188, at 35 (statement by Steven J. Gunn).
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common.192 Either a Native nation is challenging a state taxation scheme or
a state is challenging a Native nation’s refusal to turn over revenue. In
either scenario, it can take years of litigation and large amounts of time and
money by Native nations (and by states) to adjudicate the claims. On top of
these considerations, given that the law is uncertain, there is no way to
know which side will ultimately win. For some Native nations, the time
and money associated with adjudication may be neither practical nor
desirable. On the other hand, when a Native nation chooses to enter into a
tax agreement with a state, it provides that nation with certainty and “allows
the [nation] to plan for the future in terms of business plans, project
financing, and the provision of government services to tribal members.”193
The reality is that so long as both Native nations and states are thinking
in the long-term, tribal sovereign immunity in the taxation context can
actually bring Native nations and states together. This is precisely what has
happened in the state of Michigan over the past decade. Michigan is home
to twelve federally recognized tribes.194 Currently, ten of those twelve
tribes have at least one tax agreement with the state of Michigan.195 As is
often the case, Michigan’s “stated motivation to negotiate with the
Michigan Tribes stemmed mostly from its inability to collect valid taxes
from non-tribal members in Indian Country.”196 On the other side, the
Native nations “were motivated to meet with the State because the State
began to charge sales and use tax on construction contractors doing
business on reservation and trust land.”197 These taxes were, naturally,
being passed on to the Native nations of Michigan.198 In short, prior to
negotiations, Michigan believed that it was losing tax revenue to Native
nation businesses who were “exploiting tax exemptions to garner a
competitive advantage.”199 To the contrary, the Native nations believed
that the state’s tax scheme on construction contractors was “illegal” and

192. Id.
193. Fletcher, supra note 49, at 44.
194. Id. at 5.
195. According to the state of Michigan’s website, agreements exist with the Bay Mills
Indian Community (2002), Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa and Chippewa Indians (2004),
Hannahville Indian Community (2002), Little River Band of Ottawa Indians (2002), Little
Traverse Bay Bands of Odawa Indians (2002), Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of Pottawatomi
Indians (2008), Notawaseppi Band of Potawatomi Indians (2002), Pokagon Band of Potawatomi
Indians (2002), Saginaw Chippewa Indian Tribe (2010), and Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of Chippewa
Indians (2002). See Michigan Taxes, MICHIGAN DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY,
http://www michigan.gov/taxes/0,4676,7-238-43513_43517—-,00 html.
196. Fletcher, supra note 49, at 18.
197. Id. at 17.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 18.
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resulted in the state having collected “hundreds of thousands of dollars”
from the construction of Native governmental buildings on trust lands.200
Despite these conflicting views, many Native nations from Michigan
came to the bargaining table with hopes of reaching an agreement that could
not only benefit their own Native community, but that could also improve
their relationship with the state and provide stability in the realm of taxation
going forward.201 In all ten agreements, the Native nations involved are
recognized as “sovereign governments”202 with “sovereign rights,” and the
agreements themselves were produced “on a government to government
basis,” “in good faith,” “in a spirit of cooperation,” and with hopes of
finding a “fair and workable understanding regarding the application and
administration of” state tax issues.203 During the negotiations, exemptions
from six state taxes were ultimately discussed: sales and use taxes, motor
fuel taxes, tobacco taxes, income taxes, and the Michigan Single Business
Tax.204 There were also discussions about a sales tax revenue sharing
scheme for those Native nations that had already adopted their own sales
tax codes.205 Due to a number of unique legal issues arising in Michigan,
the negotiations were extremely complex.
Ultimately, however, agreements were reached between Michigan and
ten Native nations. Each of the agreements between Michigan and the
Native nations have slight variations, but all share some of the same
overarching structure. For instance, while all of the agreements exempt
tribal members from having to pay certain state sales and use taxes, the
methods for administering these exemptions vary. Some agreements
employ a “refund method” that “simply allows the Tribes to seek
reimbursement for sales and use taxes collected by vendors from the
State.”206 Other nations, who were leery of trying to get money back from
the state, utilized “certificates of exemption,” which, when presented to
state vendors along with an authorization letter from the state, allowed
purchasers to avoid having to pay the sales and use taxes at the time of
purchase.207
200. Id. at 17.
201. Id. at 44.
202. See, e.g., Tax Agreement Between the Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of Chippewa Indians and
the
State
of
Michigan
(2002),
http://www.michigan.gov/documents/
SaultSteFinalTaxAgreement_61197_7.pdf. (“Whereas, the Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of Chippewa
Indians, a sovereign government, is a federally recognized Indian Tribe located within the State of
Michigan.”).
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204. Fletcher, supra note 49, at 26.
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In addition to exemptions for tribal members, the Native nations of
Michigan negotiated the possibility of a sales tax revenue sharing scheme.
Normally, under Michigan law, Native nations who have no tribal sales tax
are required to collect the state sales tax and remit all of the money
collected to the state.208 Along with the money, Native nations are required
to send documentation indicating which sales were from tribal members so
the state could refund that portion of the tax back to the nation.209 Under
the agreements, however, Native nations who had implemented their own
sales tax provisions were able to enter into a new type of revenue sharing
with the state. The sharing scheme allowed Native nations to keep twothirds of the taxes collected on the first five million dollars in sales on their
lands and half of all taxes collected thereafter.210 The goal of this option for
Native nations was to “preserve revenues for each side as much as
possible.”211
With respect to the more contentious issues of motor fuel and tobacco
taxation, agreements were also reached. In both instances, Native nations
essentially agreed to determine a cap on the amount of tax-free sales of
these goods that would occur on their lands.212 The specifics of how a
nation administers its tax exemption can vary, however. Some Native
nations employ a “refund method” by which they provide records to the
state on sales made and the state refunds the nation its part of the tax.
Alternatively, other nations administer the exemption by a “quota method”
where “each individual Tribe and the State negotiate for a cap or quota on
the amount of tobacco products or motor fuels the Tribe may purchase taxfree for a period of time.”213 The refund method ensures that only Native
citizens recieve the tax break, whereas the quota method allows the
individual Native nations to decide “through its allocation of [the] quota
how to distribute the benefit.”214
Although the agreements negotiated touched on a myriad of issues, the
final one worth mentioning here relates to enforcement of the terms of the
agreement. It was in this context that tribal sovereign immunity once again
played a strategic role. Both Michigan and the Native nations knew that the
agreement was meaningless if it could not be enforced, and it could not be
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enforced unless Native nations agreed to waive their sovereign immunity.215
Thus, Native nations were able to strategically use sovereign immunity in
the negotiation process. In the end, tribal sovereign immunity was waived,
but only after terms of the waiver were carefully worked out and agreed
upon.216
The first condition of waiving tribal sovereign immunity was to only
allow initial claims in tribal courts. Under the terms of the agreements,
arbitration was to take place in the event of any dispute.217 However, if
arbitration did not occur, then the Native nations agreed to waive their
immunity so that Michigan could file a case in tribal court to compel
arbitration and to enforce any arbitration award.218 In the event that a tribal
court did not act on the state’s claim within fourteen days, the state was
then able to seek redress in the courts of Michigan.219 This waiver of
sovereign immunity was to survive even if a Native nation sought to
terminate the agreement.220 Otherwise, as the state argued, a Native nation
could simply terminate the agreement at any time and then use sovereign
immunity to prevent any recourse.221
Additionally, while the Native nations that signed agreements with
Michigan waived their sovereign immunity with respect to the dispute
resolution provisions, the nations were very careful to protect themselves
from other types of legal issues that may arise in the future. Most notably,
the agreements entered into included the following provisions:
First, tribal officials may not be criminally prosecuted for
violations of state law or the Agreement. Second, the State may
conduct an audit of the Tribe in regards to any of the six taxes at
issue, but must provide thirty days written notice. Third, the State
may not seize tribal assets in order to enforce a tax liability under
the Agreement. Fourth, the State may conduct unauthorized
inspections of tribal facilities for the purpose of discovering only
contraband, motor fuel or tobacco products, and may only seize
215. Likewise, the agreement would have no force if the state refused to waive its immunity
as well. See id. at 37 (“The State’s waiver for purposes of enforcement derives from current law, a
waiver through the Michigan Court of Claims.”).
216. See, e.g., Tax Agreement, supra note 202, at sec. 1(G).
217. Fletcher, supra note 49, at 41.
218. Id. at 36-37.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. It is also worth noting that the Native nations also waived sovereign immunity with
respect to the certificates of exemption that could be used with respect to sales and use taxes.
Specifically, if the state believes that the certificates of exemption are being misused, the state can
bring suit to attempt to acquire the taxes owed, but only after giving the Native nation in question
ten business days to respond to the state’s contention prior to the suit being filed. See id.
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those items that can be viewed in plain sight. Finally, the State
must go to tribal court for a search warrant to search and seize
items in tribal facilities . . . . The parties [also] agreed to allow the
State to enter Indian Country and enforce state law against nonmembers provided [first] that the State give notice of the
enforcement action to tribal law enforcement.222
In sum, while there were additional issues discussed and agreed upon
between Michigan and the Native nations who live there, the above
examples provide a brief overview of how negotiations can often lead to
better solutions for both Native nations and states than would otherwise be
possible in the litigation context. As is the case with any negotiation,
neither side was able to walk away with everything that they wanted, but
Native nations were able to prioritize the matters most important to them
and achieve some significant gains in those areas. These gains, and indeed
the negotiation itself, would likely have been more difficult, if not
impossible, had Native nations not thought strategically about sovereign
immunity and how it could be a tool in the nations’ long-term goals.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this article I have put forth arguments in favor of tribal sovereign
immunity by demonstrating that it is a tool capable of helping create strong
tribal court systems. Specifically, tribal sovereign immunity has a robust
ability to improve tribal court systems’ capacity and legitimacy, while also
expanding tribal court jurisdiction. Tribal sovereign immunity has a
limited, but meaningful role in improving tribal court systems with respect
to accountability, funding, and independence. Native nations serious about
exercising self-determination must think strategically about sovereign
immunity. The three case studies discussed here help provide a more robust
picture of how Native nations with strong court systems are approaching the
issue. While additional research should be done to verify the various
connections between tribal sovereign immunity policies and strong tribal
court systems, the time has come when no Native nation serious about selfdetermination can ignore the ramifications of how its own policy with
respect to tribal sovereign immunity is affecting the nation’s future.
Additionally, no Native nation serious about self-determination can ignore
the reality that the strategic management of the tribal sovereign immunity
doctrine can be an effective tool to bring about positive change for any
Native nation.

222. Id. at 41.

